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 What is the nature of the impact of military expenditure on economic 
development in developing countries? Results of past studies using diverse approaches to 
this question are very mixed. Those results include positive, negative, or no effects of 
military expenditure on economic development. It all depends on different approaches, 
sample countries, time period, and data sources. In order to resolve these problems, there 
is a need to decompose the research problem into several separate questions: what kind of 
impact and how does it occur; the impact of what (measures of defense burden) on what 
(measures of economic performance); what are the opportunity costs of chosen policies; 
and what are the policy implications of the impact? In order to perform consistent 
analysis of these diverse research questions using a uniform set of regression equations, 
this dissertation will adapt the structuralist approach used by Faini, Annez, and Taylor  
who modified the “patterns of development” approach developed by Chenery and 
Syrquin. Seventeen dependent variables are analyzed as a function of military burden, 
globalization index, net financial inflow, GDP per capita, and population. These 
dependent variables include investment and savings, private and public consumption, 
education and health spending, agricultural and industrial output, unemployment rate, 
export and import, foreign direct investment, urbanization rate, income distribution, life 
expectancy, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate. Regression analyses were run on the 





Results of the analyses revealed that the nature of the impact of military 
expenditure on economic development is mostly negative. It has negative impacts on 
capital formation, industrialization, and social well-being. Structuralists pay particular 
attention to industrialization and capital formation because they are the most crucial 
factors of economic development for any developing country. Social well-being, 
measured by physical quality of life, is central to the expanded definition of economic 
development. Negative impact of military expenditure on these crucial aspects of 
economic development is the most significant findings of this dissertation. On the other 
hand, the increase in military expenditures seems to decrease the unemployment rate, and 
there seems to be no negative trade-offs between military expenditures and education and 
health spending.  
The policy implication from this analysis is that the military expenditure should 
not be seen as a tool for economic development in developing countries. It is not 
development promoting as Benoit suggested, but it is actually development hampering. It 
may have a power to absorb unskilled workers to alleviate unemployment rate, but its 
negative impact reaches far greater aspects of economic development. Its negative impact 
on industrialization, capital formation, and physical quality of life means that the increase 
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 The subject of military expenditures has been on many economists’ minds for a 
long time. As far back as the 18th and 19th centuries, economists discussed the economic 
impact of military expenditures on society. In Wealth of Nations, after recognizing that 
the first duty of the sovereign was to protect the society from the violence and invasion 
by means of the military, Adam Smith expressed his concern about increasing costs of 
the military by stating that the duty of defending grew more and more expensive as the 
society advanced in civilization (Smith, 1776/1991). Similarly, David Ricardo was 
concerned about the opportunity cost of unproductive government consumption such as 
military expenditure in following quote: 
Taxes which are levied on a country for the purpose of supporting war, or for the 
ordinary expenses of the state, and which are chiefly devoted to the support of 
unproductive labourers, are taken from the productive industry of the country. 
(Ricardo, 1817/2004, p. 160) 
 
Ricardo seemed to consider an issue of military expenditure crowding out private 
investment and private consumption. When Paul Samuelson used the “guns vs. butter” 
example in his classic 1948 textbook Economics to illustrate the production possibility 
frontier, he must have been thinking about the opportunity cost of military expenditures 
as Smith and Ricardo did (Samuelson, 1948). The fact that Samuelson used the following 
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quote by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in later editions of the same book suggests that 
he was indeed thinking about the opportunity costs of military expenditures. “Every gun 
that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a 
theft from those who hunger and are not fed” (as cited in Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1995, p. 
7). This “guns vs. butter” is a great example to show the concept of scarcity and 
opportunity cost to 1st-year economics students. The opportunity cost is defined by 
Schiller as the following: “every time we choose to use scarce resources in one way we 
give up the opportunity to use them in other ways” (Schiller, 2000, p. 6). So when 
government decides to spend their budgets on military, they have to give up the 
opportunity to use them in other services. Every nation faces this “guns vs. butter” 
dilemma when they make their decision on how much of their government budgets to 
spend on the military or on other services. Since available resources are very limited for 
many developing countries, there are high opportunity costs associated with high military 
spending in most developing countries. 
 Considering the possibility of a huge impact of military expenditures on 
economies of these developing countries, one would expect the subject of military 
expenditures in developing countries to be prominent in the field of development 
economics. However, this subject has been largely neglected by most textbooks of 
development economics, hence, there has not been much discussion in classrooms of 
development economics concerning military expenditures. Among several textbooks of 
development economics, some of them do not even mention the military expenditures. 
Economic Development by Ray (1998) does not have any entry of either defense 
spending or military expenditures in its index. Also, The Puzzle of Latin American 
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Economic Development by Franko (1999), Frontiers of Development Economics edited 
by Meier and Stiglitz (2001), and Leading Issues in Economic Development (8th ed.) by 
Meier and Rauch (2005) did not mention military expenditures at all. The Economics of 
Developing Countries (3rd ed.) by Nafziger (1997) mentioned military expenditures in 
three places, but each mention was only a paragraph long. Economic Development (9th 
ed.) by Todaro and Smith (2006) was the only textbook that devoted nearly four pages of 
their text to discuss the significance and economic impact of military expenditures in 
developing countries. Considering how much most developing countries spend on 
military out of their limited government budget, it is very important to at least discuss the 
significance and the nature of the impact of military expenditures of developing countries 
in the classroom of development economics. 
 The lack of treatment of this subject in development economics and its 
significance to economies of developing countries are chief motivations of this 
dissertation to investigate the impact of military expenditures on developing countries. 
This dissertation will make a contribution to the field of development economics by 
investigating the nature and significance of the impact of military expenditures on the 
economies of developing countries by utilizing the research method, which is based on 
the economic model from the field of development economics. This dissertation will start 
by asking the following simple question: What is the nature of impacts of high military 
expenditures to economic development in many developing countries? Is it negative, 
positive, or neither? The literature review in next chapter will reveal that the answer to 
this simple question is not that simple, and in fact, it is very mixed. It is a main objective 
of this dissertation to add better understanding of this complicated subject matter. Before 
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going into details of how this study will proceed, the next section will illustrate recent 
trends of military expenditures in developing countries. 
 
1.1 Recent Trends of Military Expenditures in Developing Countries 
The military expenditures in developing countries have been rising throughout the 
last several decades. Figure 1.1 shows the recent trend of military expenditures in 
constant 2014 US$ in billions between 1992 and 2014. This graph shows that military 
expenditures by developing countries started to rise again in the late 1990s after slowing 
down in the early 1990s. The rise is most noticeable in Asia and the Middle East, 
although spending in three other regions has also increased. In the last few years, 
combined total spending by developing countries even surpassed the spending of the 
United States, which has been by far the largest spender on military in the world. 
According to Todaro and Smith (2006), the dollar amount of military expenditures in 
developing countries has increased almost six times between 1960 ($35 billion) and 2000 
($200 billion).  
Figure 1.2 shows the shares in world military expenditures in the same period of 
1992 and 2014. This graph also shows rising trend of military spending by developing 
countries, especially in Asia and the Middle East. The combined shares of developing 
countries have also surpassed the share of the United States in the last few years. 
According to Todaro and Smith (2006), developing countries’ share of the world military 
expenditures increased more than three times between 1960 (8.6%) and 2000 (27.5%). 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this 













































































Figure 1.1 Military Expenditures in Constant 2014 Billion US$ 
Figure 1.2 Shares in World Military Expenditures 
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(SIPRI, 2016a). The military expenditures in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean 
decreased in 2015. The decline in Africa was the first decline in 11 years. However,     
the increasing trend in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Oceania, and the Middle 
East, in which data are available, still continued in 2015 (SIPRI, 2016a). 
 In addition to the dollar amount of the military expenditures and the share in the 
world military expenditures, there is another way to measure the military expenditure in 
the developing countries. It is called a military burden, which is the military spending as 
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP). The 
majority of past studies of military expenditures in developing countries used this 
measure of military expenditures because it reflects the economic burden of military 
expenditure in the country. This dissertation will adopt the military burden as a measure 
of military expenditures in the analysis. Many developing countries have been suffering 
from high military burdens. Some countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East, 
have experienced periods of extreme high military burdens of over 20% or even over 
100% under some extreme circumstances, such as engaging in external or internal 
conflicts. For example, the military burden in Kuwait was 48% in 1990 and 117% in 
1991 when Iraq invaded their country (SIPRI, 2016b). Also, when Eritrea was involved 
in the war with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000, their military burden was above 30% 
(SIPRI, 2016b).  In Angola, which was in the long period of civil war between 1975 and 
2002, the military burden was consistently above 10% with occasional spikes to close to 
30% (SIPRI, 2016b). An average of the military burden for 119 developing countries in 
the period of 1960-2010 in the data set of this dissertation is 3.03%. Regionally, an 
average of the military burden is 2.52% in Africa, 2.58% in Asia and Oceania, 2.73% in 
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Central and Eastern Europe, 1.73% in Latin America, and 7.38% in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the trend of military burdens for 12 developing countries in 
the data set of this dissertation between 1960 and 2010. A few countries from each of five 
regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the 
Middle East and Northern Africa) were selected mainly because of the completeness of 
their data during the time period. This figure shows that the military burdens in two 









































Figure 1.3 Military Burdens in 12 Developing Countries 1960 - 2010 
Sources: (SIPRI, 1969-2012), (The World Bank, 2004, 2012)
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reflecting a volatile situation in the region. These countries were involved in multiple 
conflicts during that time period. Military burdens of all other countries were generally 
lower than 10%. Since the late-1980s to early-1990s, military burdens went down below 
5% in these countries. One exception is Saudi Arabia, whose military burden has been 
rising in the 2000s. The fact that military burdens have decreased in most developing 
countries in the last 2 decades or so in spite of increases in actual dollar amount indicates 
that their GDPs have been increasing faster than the increase in the military expenditures 
in many developing countries. 
 These recent statistics showed that the military expenditure in developing 
countries has been rising steadily the last few decades at least on actual dollar amount 
and spending shares of the world. What will be the impacts of this continued high 
military spending on the economies of developing countries? The next section will briefly 
review past studies of military expenditure in developing countries. 
 
1.2 Past Studies of Military Expenditures in Developing Countries 
 Even though there has been a lack of discussion about military expenditures in 
development economics textbooks, it does not necessarily mean that there has been a lack 
of literature discussing the military expenditures in developing countries. Ever since 
Emile Benoit published his seminal book Defense and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries in 1973, there have been many attempts to analyze effects of military 
expenditures on economies of developing countries (Benoit, 1973). Benoit found that 
there was a strong positive correlation between military expenditure and economic 
growth in 44 developing countries during 1950 to 1965 (Benoit, 1973). After this rather 
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surprising result was published, many studies followed to examine the effect of military 
expenditures on the economy of developing countries. Since there is no economic theory 
specifically developed to analyze the effect of military expenditure, researchers have to 
adapt some economic model from other economic fields to perform their analyses. That 
leads to a variety of econometric models reflecting different theoretical perspectives, such 
as Keynesian, neoclassical, and structuralist (Dunne, Smith, & Willenbockel, 2005).  
The Keynesian models usually focus on the level and composition of expenditure 
on the demand side (Dunne et al., 2005). Researchers using Keynesian models argue that 
military expenditures are beneficial to their economies by increasing the effective 
aggregate demand through Keynesian multiplier effect. In economies with excess 
production capacity, increased aggregate demand by the military spending will drive up 
output, capacity utilization, and profits rates, which in turn may increase investment 
(Faini, Annez, & Taylor, 1984). However, since military expenditures have opportunity 
costs and may crowd out other expenditures, such as investment, private consumption, 
and other public expenditures, whether the increase in military expenditures leads to 
economic growth depends on prior capacity utilization rate and how it is financed (Dunne 
et al., 2005).  
Neoclassical models usually focus on the supply side of the economy, especially 
the availability of technology and factors of production, such as labor, physical and 
human capital, and natural resources (Dunne et al., 2005). “Some of the demand effects 
(e.g. crowding out of investment) may also have supply effects by changing the capital 
stock” (Dunne et al., 2005, p. 451). Military expenditures can divert resources such as 
capital stock, foreign exchange, and skilled labor, from capital formation, then private 
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investment and output net of military spending will fall (Faini et al., 1984). Even though 
the resources used by military are not available for civilian use, there may be externalities, 
such as training in the military, which can be useful in civilian employment, and military 
technologies, which may have civilian spin-offs (Dunne et al., 2005). This approach used 
many different types of growth equations to analyze the effect of military expenditures on 
the economy.  
Structuralists focus “on the mechanism by which underdeveloped economies 
transform their domestic economic structures from a heavy emphasis on traditional 
subsistence agriculture to a more modern, more urbanized, and more industrially diverse 
manufacturing and service economy” (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 108). This means that 
when they discuss the structural change, it includes the change in virtually all economic 
functions, “including the transformation of production and changes in the composition of 
consumer demand, international trade, and resource use as well as changes in 
socioeconomic factors such as urbanization and the growth and distribution of a country’s 
population” (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 113). The structuralists’ approaches were based 
on two key concepts, namely, dualism and complementarity (Chenery, 1975). An 
economy is dualistic when it is divided into two different sectors, a modern sector and a 
traditional sector (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). A modern sector is usually identified with 
manufacturing with high level of income, productivity, capital intensiveness, and wage 
employment (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). A traditional sector is usually identified with 
agriculture with low productivity, poverty, and low capital intensity (Sanchez-Ancochea, 
2007). Structuralists consider a modern sector to be more conducive to economic 
development and believe modernizing a traditional sector to be important as well. A 
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wider classification can be applied to urban and rural sectors or large-scale and small-
scale productions (Deger, 1992). Another key concept for structuralists is that many 
investments are complementary in the economy. “The expansion of production in one 
sector is only profitable if it is accompanied by the expansion of production in other 
sectors” (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007, p. 210). This concept implies that the backward and 
forward linkages in the economy are very important for economic development in the 
developing countries. These two key concepts indicate that the structuralists consider the 
interconnection of the disaggregated sectors of economy to be crucial to economic 
development. This structuralist approach can be applied to the study of the impact of 
military expenditures on the economies of developing countries. According to Deger 
(1992), the best structuralist models to analyze the impact of military expenditures in 
developing countries is a study by Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984), which takes a series 
of dependent variables that reflect the concerns of structuralists, namely, investment, 
imports, industrial production, agricultural production, and tax receipts. Their results 
show that the military expenditures crowd out investment, and that it has negative and 
significant impact on agriculture. Their regression model can be easily expanded to 
include more dependent variables that have significance in structuralists’ perspective. 
Results of studies using these diverse approaches are very mixed. Some studies, 
like Benoit’ study (1973), found positive impact of military expenditures on the 
economies of developing countries. Other studies found negative impacts of military 
expenditure on economic growth. Some studies did not find any significant effect of 
military expenditure on economies of developing countries at all. Sandler and Hartley 
(1995) argued that most demand side studies ended up with negative results on the one 
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hand and supply side studies with no significance or small positive effects on the other. 
However, there were exceptions to this classification. In any case, there is no consensus 
among researchers concerning the nature of the relationship between military 
expenditures and economic development in developing countries. Chan (1985) attributed 
these mixed results of past studies to the problems of different data sources, different 
samples, different methods, difference between cross-sectional and longitudinal, and the 
difference in researchers’ ideologies. In order to resolve these problems, Chan suggested 
a need to decompose the research problem into several separate questions: what kind of 
impact and how does it occur; the impact of what (measures of defense burden) on what 
(measures of economic performance); what are the opportunity costs of this impact; and 
what are the policy implications of the impact (Chan, 1985). This dissertation will try to 
answer these questions, but a question of the impact of what (measures of burden) on 
what (measures of economic performance) has to be discussed first.  
As mentioned earlier, this dissertation will use military expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP for the military burden variable. A question of what measures of 
economic performance will be used is more complicated to answer. It all depends on the 
definition of economic development. Most development economists agree that economic 
growth is essential but not sufficient for economic development. Sen (1983) argues that 
economic growth is not synonymous to economic development, and that it is no more 
than a means to some other objectives. He argues that ultimately, the economic 
development must be concerned with what people can do or cannot do (Sen, 1983). Then, 
based on Sen’s argument, Todaro and Smith asked the question of whether it is possible 
to define “development as the sustained elevation of entire society and social system 
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toward a ‘better’ or ‘more humane’ life” (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 20). They argued that 
there are at least three common core values for understanding the meaning of 
development: sustenance, which is the ability to meet basic needs; self-esteem, which is a 
sense of worth and self-respect; and freedom from servitude, which is an ability to choose 
(Todaro & Smith, 2006). Based on these three core values, they argued that development 
in any society must have at least the following three objectives: to increase the 
availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods; to raise levels of 
living; to expand the range of economic and social choices (Todaro & Smith, 2006). Ray 
(1998) includes the following goals to these objectives: the removal of poverty and 
malnutrition; an increase in life expectancy; an access to sanitation, clean drinking water, 
and health services; the reduction of infant mortality; and increased access to knowledge 
and schooling, and literacy. Nafziger (1997) suggested the following three alternative 
measures for economic development: Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which 
consists of infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and literacy rate; Human Development 
Index (HDI), which consists of literacy rate, life expectancy, gross enrollment rate, and 
GDP per capita; and Basic Needs Attainment such as food, education, health, sanitation, 
water supply, and housing. These objectives of economic development were included in 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals in 2000 as well (Todaro & Smith, 
2006). These expanded definitions of economic development cannot be dealt with in 
demand side or supply side approaches due to the fact that their main focus is usually 
only on economic growth. Only structuralist approaches can handle these broad 
definitions of economic development since many of their focuses coincide with these 
definitions. Structuralists pay attention to industrialization, structure of production and 
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trade, agricultural sector, urban and rural sector, income distributions and poverty, and 
other socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, this dissertation will combine a broad 
definition of economic development, especially its focus on income distribution and 
physical quality of life, with a structuralist approach to investigate the impact of military 
expenditures in developing countries.  
 
1.3 Research Method of This Study 
The research questions of this dissertation will be following. What is the nature of 
the impact of military expenditure on economic development in the developing 
countries? What are the opportunity costs of high spending? What are the policy 
implications of the impact? In order to perform consistent analysis of these diverse 
research questions using a uniform set of regression equations, this study will adapt the 
structuralist approach used by Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984) who modified the 
“patterns of development” approach developed by Chenery and Syrquin (1975). Faini, 
Annez, and Taylor (1984)  added military burden as an additional explanatory variable to 
the regression model by Chenery and Syrquin (1975), which includes GDP per capita, 
population, and financial inflow as its explanatory variables. In order to analyze 
multifaceted issues of economic development in developing countries, Chenery and 
Syrquin (1975) ran this uniform set of regression equations against many dependent 
variables (total of 27 variables) that were related to economic development. These 
dependent variables cover investment and savings, education, consumptions, production, 
trade, employment, urbanization and population change, and income distributions 
(Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). They took structuralist approach to expand the definition of 
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development beyond GDP growth. 
This dissertation will follow their approach, with some modifications, to examine 
the impact of military expenditures on economic development in developing countries. 
Deger and Smith (1983) listed four possible channels through which military expenditure 
may influence the economy: resource allocation and mobilization; organization of 
production; sociopolitical structure; and external relations. Combining these channels 
with the list of dependent variables of Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and taking a broader 
definition of development into consideration, this dissertation will have the following 17 
dependent variables in the analysis. Resource allocation channel includes investment, 
savings, private and public consumption, and education and health spending. Production 
and trade (external relations) channels include agricultural and industrial production, 
unemployment rate, export and import, and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Socioeconomic channel includes urbanization rate, income distribution, and physical 
quality of life (life expectancy, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate). Even though all 
dependent variables are identified with a structuralist approach, some of the variables can 
be identified with two other approaches as well. Investment, savings, private and public 
consumption, education and health spending, export, import, and income distribution are 
identified with the demand side approach. Investment, savings, agricultural and industrial 
production, unemployment, export, import, and foreign direct investment are identified 
with the supply side approach. Urbanization and physical quality of life are specifically 





1.4 Overview of Regression Results 
Results of the regression analyses of this dissertation reveal that the military 
expenditures have mostly negative impact on the economies of developing countries with 
a few exceptions. There are negative impacts on capital formation, industrialization, and 
physical quality of life. Since structuralists consider industrialization crucial to economic 
development, this negative impact on capital formation and industrialization is very 
significant. Also, negative impacts on physical quality of life indicate that the military 
expenditures hinder broader definition of economic development as well. It has a 
negative impact on basic human needs. On the other hand, the increase in military 
expenditures seems to decrease the unemployment rate, and there are no measurable 
negative trade-offs between military expenditures and education and health spending. 
These results will be discussed in more details in Chapters 4-6.  
The next chapter will review past studies, followed by a chapter of the research 
method and data set, then followed by three chapters of regression results, and the 







Benoit’s seminal study in 1973 adopted a regression equation that Sandler and 
Hartley (1995) called ad hoc equation. Benoit used a single equation OLS estimation to 
analyze the correlation between military expenditure and economic growth. He ran a 
simple linear regression analysis with cumulative real growth rate of total GDP as a 
dependent variable and with independent variables including the defense burden as the 
ratio of defense expenditures to GDP, investment as the ratio of gross capital formation to 
GDP, and net receipts of bilateral foreign aid as the ratio to GDP (Benoit, 1973). He ran 
this regression on the data set consisting of 44 developing countries during 1950 to 1965, 
and found that there was a strong positive correlation between military expenditure and 
economic growth (Benoit, 1973). His conclusion was repeated in his 1978 paper as he 
stated that “countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of 
growth, and those with the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth 
rates” (Benoit, 1978, p. 271). He attributed many factors for this positive correlation. 
Higher military spending may provide the following benefits: better nutritional and other 
consumption standards by feeding, clothing, and housing a number of people; education 
and medical care; better infrastructures; modernization by scientific and technical 
advances; and the sense of nation building (Benoit, 1978). However, Benoit seemed to be 
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very skeptical of his own conclusion. He mentioned that this positive correlation might be 
spurious, caused by other factors influencing both the defense burden and the GDP 
growth. He also revealed that the positive result was only found in the 1960-1965 period 
but not found in the 1950-1965 period (Benoit, 1978). Although this surprising result 
seemed to be not robust, the biggest contribution of his study was the fact that it became 
the starting point of the subsequent discussions and stimulated so many studies analyzing 
the relationship between the military expenditure and the economic development in the 
developing countries. Frederiksen and Looney (1983) used exactly the same equation as 
Benoit’s study and analyzed 37 out of 44 countries of Benoit’s study, but they divided 
them into financially resource-rich countries and financially constrained countries. Their 
results showed that the higher defense burden was positively correlated with the 
economic growth in the rich countries and negatively correlated in the poor countries, 
confirming Benoit’s result partially for resource-rich countries (Frederiksen & Looney, 
1983).  
 Benoit’s study also generated criticism against it. Ball (1983) examined Benoit’s 
study and found a few problems with his study. The first problem was Benoit’s choice of 
bilateral foreign aid as foreign financial inflow and ignored foreign private investment, 
multilateral aid, and military assistance (Ball, 1983). These more inclusive measures of 
foreign resource inflow might be more closely associated with the economic growth than 
the bilateral foreign aid (Ball, 1983). Second, most of the contributions of the military 
expenditures to the civilian economy listed by Benoit were unquantifiable. The fact that 
Benoit based his conclusion on these unquantifiable factors made his conclusion 
debatable (Ball, 1983). Either agree or disagree with his study, it certainly generated the 
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discussion and stimulated a lot of subsequent studies concerning the impact of military 
expenditures in developing countries. 
Benoit’s single ad hoc equation approach quickly gave way to a variety of 
econometric models, reflecting different theoretical perspectives (Dunne, Smith, & 
Willenbockel, 2005). “Keynesian, neoclassical and structuralist models were applied 
using a variety of specifications, econometric estimators and types of sample in cross-
section, time-series or panels” (Dunne et al., 2005, p. 449). Since the literature 
concerning the effect of military expenditure on the economies of developing countries is 
rather extensive, it may be useful to start the literature review with dividing the past 
studies into some categories, even though some studies, such as Benoit’s, do not belong 
to any of these categories. Sandler and Hartley (1995) divided past studies on growth and 
defense into demand side models and supply side models. The demand side approach is 
closely associated with the Keynesian approach and the supply side approach is 
associated with the neoclassical approach. In addition to demand side and supply side 
approaches, some studies combined these two approaches into simultaneous equation 
models. Furthermore, some studies adopted the structuralist approach. This literature 
review chapter is divided into four sections. First is the demand side approach. Second is 
the supply side approach. Third is the simultaneous equation approach. Finally, the fourth 
section is the structuralist approach. 
 
2.1 Demand Side Approach 
 Demand side models focus on level and composition of expenditures. Their 
regression equations are usually derived from national account identities with output on 
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one side and expenditures, such as consumption, investment, government expenditures, 
and export and imports, on another side. Demand effects, such as Keynesian multiplier 
effect, operate through level and composition of expenditures (Dunne et al., 2005). In 
economies with excess production capacity, increased aggregate demand by the military 
spending will drive up output, capacity utilization, and profits rates, which in turn may 
increase investment (Faini, Annez, & Taylor, 1984). However, since military 
expenditures have opportunity costs and may crowd out other expenditures, such as 
investment, private consumption, and other public expenditures, whether the increase in 
military expenditures leads to economic growth depends on prior capacity utilization rate 
and how it is financed (Dunne et al., 2005).  
 The first half of the study by Faini et al. (1984) is a demand side model with an 
“equation which relates the growth rate of output to change in exports, population, 
defense burden, capital inflows, and capital stock, with GDP per capita included as a 
scaling variable” (Faini et al., 1984, p. 491). They used a regression analysis for 69 
countries over the period 1952-1970, which largely overlapped with Benoit’s study 
period of 1950-1965, and found a consistently negative sign of the coefficient for the 
change in the defense burden (Faini et al., 1984).  
 Stewart (1991) started his study from the same starting point as Faini et al. (1984) 
but modified it to include nonmilitary government expenditures in independent variables 
and added the import function equation to the absorptive capacity limitation equation that 
was in Faini et al. (1984). He then used the regression results to run simulations to find 
that high defense burden and high nondefense burden are both stimulative to economic 
growth and that defense burden is more stimulative than nondefense burden (Stewart, 
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1991). This result contradicts the result of Faini et al. (1984), even though their 
econometric models were derived from almost the same national account identities, and 
supports the positive result of Benoit (1973, 1978).  
 Smith (1980) used the demand side model to 14 OECD countries to test the 
hypothesis that reduced investment has been a major opportunity cost of military 
expenditure. He used the share of investment as a function of the share of military 
expenditure, growth rate, and demand pressure, and found clear, almost one for one, 
negative effect of military expenditure on investment (Smith, 1980). 
 
2.2 Supply Side Approach 
 Supply side approaches focus on supply effects that “operate through the 
availability of factors of production (labor, physical and human capital and natural 
resources) and technology, which together determine potential output” (Dunne et al., 
2005, p. 451). Regression equations of the supply side approach are usually derived from 
some form of production functions with capital, labor, and technology. Military 
expenditures can divert resources such as capital stock, foreign exchange, and skilled 
labor, from capital formation, then private investment and output net of military spending 
will fall (Faini et al., 1984). On the other hand, even though the resources used by 
military are not available for civilian use, there may be externalities, such as training in 
the military, which can be useful in civilian employment, and military technologies, 
which may have civilian spin-offs (Dunne et al., 2005). Supply side models usually adapt 
some form of growth equations to do their analyses. 
 Lim (1983) started his equation from the Harrod-Domar capital-centered growth 
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equation with the function of incremental output-capital ratio and gross domestic 
investment to GDP ratio. His final estimating growth equations are functions of 
incremental output-capital ratio, defense expenditure to GDP ratio (or defense 
expenditure to total government expenditure ratio), and deficit on current account to 
gross national saving ratio (Lim, 1983). He ran these regressions with the data from 54 
countries over the period 1965-1973, and found that the military spending was 
detrimental to economic growth (Lim, 1983). Milne (1984) used a similar approach by 
using a modified Harrod-Domar growth equation. It differed from Lim’s study by 
focusing on Latin America, and also by including military government variable as an 
additional independent variable (Milne, 1984). His study also found a statistically 
significant negative relationship between defense spending and economic growth (Milne, 
1984). Biswas and Ram (1986) criticized this approach by saying that model used in 
these analyses is “really an identity, and it is doubtful that this form can provide an 
appropriate basis for identifying the impact of defense spending on growth” (Biswas & 
Ram, 1986, p. 366). 
 Then, Biswas and Ram (1986) considered the externality effect of the military 
sector on the civilian sector and the magnitude of the relative factor productivity 
differential across two sectors by using Feder’s augmented growth model. Their study 
was based on two hypotheses that the military sector might generate positive or negative 
externalities for the rest of the economy, and there might be an important factor 
productivity difference between two sectors (Biswas & Ram, 1986). They adopted 
Feder’s neoclassical growth model, which was specified in the context of the role of 
exports in growth, by substituting the military sector for the export sector (Biswas & Ram, 
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1986). Their two-sector analysis yielded no statistically significant externality effect and 
no significant factor productivity difference across two sectors for the sample of 
developing countries in the 60s and 70s (Biswas & Ram, 1986). However, Biswas (1993) 
analyzed more recent data for the 80s using the same model and found a positive 
relationship between military spending and economic growth (Biswas, 1993). Many 
studies, such as Murdoch, Pi, and Sandler (1997), and Birdi, Dunne, and Saal (2000), 
adopted some variants of this model and also found positive results. “The popularity of 
the approach lies in the appearance of a direct link from theoretical model to econometric 
specification” (Dunne et al., 2005, p. 453). This model seems to be well grounded in the 
neoclassical theory of growth (Dunne et al., 2005). However, Dunne et al. (2005) point 
out that “the model is, by construction, incapable of accounting for intra-sectoral 
organizational inefficiencies” (Dunne et al., 2005, p. 455). In addition to theoretical 
problems, they list more empirical problems like multicollinearity between two terms 
with military expenditures, and asymmetry in the treatment of investment and labor in the 
equation as investment in share and labor in growth rate (Dunne et al., 2005). Because of 
these problems, they recommend not to use this model for future research (Dunne et al., 
2005). 
 
2.3 Simultaneous Equation Approach 
 Deger and Smith (1983) proposed to use a simultaneous equation model for the 
analysis with both demand side and supply side approaches. They argue that military 
expenditure is an endogenous not exogenous variable and all endogenous variables are 
determined simultaneously (Deger & Smith, 1983). They argue that there are four 
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channels through which military expenditure may influence production (Deger & Smith, 
1983). The first channel is the resource allocation and mobilization channel. In resource 
allocation, military expenditure may have direct opportunity costs in terms of forgone 
investment and consumption. If the weapons are imported, it may have balance of 
payments costs (Deger & Smith, 1983). On the other hand, if there is inadequate 
aggregate demand in the economy, military demand may be met by utilization of 
underutilized capital and increased employment of labor, which means surplus labor may 
be mobilized (Deger & Smith, 1983). The second channel is the organization of 
production. New technology may be introduced to the society through the military and 
also training in technical skills and discipline may be given in the military (Deger & 
Smith, 1983). The third channel is the socio-political structure. Military may have an 
influence on administration, social structure, and internal security (Deger & Smith, 1983). 
The fourth channel is the external relations. Military may provide security from external 
threats as well as a major link to larger powers through transfer of technology and 
provision of aid (Deger & Smith, 1983). They argue that in order to examine these 
channels, the econometric model has to allow for direct effect of military expenditure on 
growth through the resource mobilization and modernization effect, indirect effect 
through savings ratio, and the endogeneity of military expenditure (Deger & Smith, 1983). 
Their simultaneous equation model includes growth equation, savings equation, and 
military expenditure equation (Deger & Smith, 1983). The growth equation is derived 
from production function just as the supply side model, and independent variables 
include savings ratio, external capital flow ratio, population growth rate, military burden, 
1970 per capita income, and annual growth rate of agricultural product (Deger & Smith, 
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1983). They included growth rate of agricultural product following the “structuralist” 
approach to development (Deger & Smith, 1983). The savings /investment function is 
derived from output-expenditure national account identity just as a demand side approach 
is, and independent variables include average annual growth rate of real GDP, external 
capital flow ratio, population growth rate, military burden, and product of 1970 per capita 
income and GDP growth rate (Deger & Smith, 1983). The military equation is a function 
of strategic, security, and wealth variables (Deger, 1992). Their results showed that the 
coefficient on military expenditure was positive 0.35 with t-ratio 2.77 in the growth 
equation, and it was negative -0.43 with t-ratio -3.16 in the savings equation (Deger & 
Smith, 1983). Deger (1986) included an additional equation of trade balance in the 
analysis and showed the similar result with a positive coefficient of military expenditure 
0.29 with t-ratio 2.5 in the growth equation, a negative -0.56 with t-ratio -3.72 in the 
savings equation, and a negative -2.45 with t-ratio -2.88 in the trade balance equation .  
Many studies adopted this approach. Scheetz (1991) used a simultaneous equation 
model on pooled data for Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. Results for the pooled 
data showed that military expenditure was negatively correlated to GDP growth, the 
domestic savings rate, and the current account balance (Scheetz, 1991). Results for 
individual countries showed very similar results except for a few instances where the sign 
switched to positive or it was not statistically significant (Scheetz, 1991). Scheetz (2002) 
re-examined the military expenditures in Guatemala, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay 
and Peru, and all results showed that military expenditure had a significantly negative 
effect on GDP growth, investment, and current account balance, in spite of the fact that 
the military burden had been falling in these countries especially after their transition to 
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democratic governments. Dunne, Nikolaidou, and Roux (2000) used a Keynesian 
simultaneous equation to find an overall negative effect of military spending on the South 
African economy, although the significance of coefficients was low. Sezgin (2001) used a 
Deger-type simultaneous equation model on Turkey to find that the defense sector 
stimulated economic growth but had no significant effect on savings and the balance of 
trade. Galvin (2003) used the similar simultaneous equation model to examine 64 
developing countries, but separated countries into low-income countries and middle-
income countries in addition to the whole sample. Results showed that the effect of 
military burden was negative and significant only in the middle-income countries, 
indicating that the impact was more severe for middle-income countries (Galvin, 2003). 
This approach requires that all endogenous variables be determined 
simultaneously with reciprocal causality. It estimates simultaneous impacts of each 
endogenous variable on other endogenous variables.  
 
2.4 Structuralist Approach 
 Syrquin (1988) defined the “structure” in the development economics in 
following quote: 
The most common use of structure in development and in economic history 
refers to the relative importance of sectors in the economy in terms of production 
and factor use. Industrialization is then the central process of structural change. 
In this sense - structure as the composition of an aggregate - the term is also 
applied to other aggregates that have some bearing on the process of 
industrialization such as demand and trade. (Syquin, 1988, p. 206) 
 
Then, “the interrelated processes of structural change that accompany economic 
development are jointly referred to as the structural transformation” (Syquin, 1988, p. 
206). Structuralists pay particular attention to this structural transformation, which 
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includes all aspects of economy, including investment and savings, education, production 
and trade, employment, urbanization, demographic transitions, and income distributions. 
The structuralists based their analyses of structural transformation on two key concepts, 
dualism and complementarity (Chenery, 1975).  
Complementarity implies that “the expansion of production in one sector is only 
profitable if it is accompanied by the expansion of production in other sectors” (Sanchez-
Ancochea, 2007, p. 210). This idea leads to the concept of balanced growth, which 
emphasized government intervention and import-substitution industrialization to achieve 
a higher rate of growth (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). Then, structuralists switched their 
attention to unbalanced growth, which emphasized the importance of industries with 
backward and forward linkages with other sectors of the economy (Sanchez-Ancochea, 
2007). Sanchez-Ancochea (2007) argued that both approaches shed some light on 
different dimensions of development process. There is the need for some balance 
between different sectors of the economy, and there are certain sectors of economy that 
can act as engines of growth and development (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). Perhaps the 
military sector can be such an engine for development. They both considered “the need 
for government planning but promoted two different ways of doing it” (Sanchez-
Ancochea, 2007, p. 213). In any case, both approaches emphasized the importance of 
interconnectedness in the economy. 
Another key concept is dualism in which an economy is divided into two different 
sectors, the modern sector and traditional sector. A modern sector is usually identified 
with manufacturing with high level of income, productivity, capital intensiveness, and 
wage employment (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). A traditional sector is usually identified 
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with agriculture with low productivity, poverty, and low capital intensity (Sanchez-
Ancochea, 2007). This concept was formulated by W. Arthur Lewis in the mid-1950s 
(Todaro & Smith, 2006). The traditional rural sector is subsistence agricultural economy 
with overpopulation, and the modern urban sector is industrial sector with high 
productivity (Todaro & Smith, 2006). Surplus labor with zero marginal labor productivity 
is gradually transferred to modern industrial sector from rural agricultural sector until all 
surplus labor is eliminated (Todaro & Smith, 2006). This process of urbanization is very 
important for early stages of economic development. Also, structuralists consider the 
elimination of the structural difference between traditional and modern sectors to be the 
main cause of growth in the first stages of development (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). That 
is why both the agricultural sector and industrial sector are significant for the economic 
development for structuralists’ perspective. A wider classification of dualism can be 
applied to urban and rural sectors or large-scale and small-scale productions (Deger, 
1992). In addition, especially for Latin American structuralists, dualism of a center 
(developed countries) and periphery (developing countries) in the world economy is 
significant in the economies of developing countries. They argued that “during early 
stages of capitalist development, technical progress was distributed asymmetrically 
among countries and a binary opposition between centers and periphery was created” 
(Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007, p. 221).  
This concept of center-periphery relationship was incorporated in a couple of 
studies of military expenditures. Davis, Kick, and Kiefer (1989) examined the impact of 
militarization on the national development in the world system context (center-periphery 
relationships). Their dependent variables were per capita gross domestic product in 1982 
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and Gastil’s index of basic political rights in 1979, and independent variables included 
world-system position, average number of soldiers per capita, military regimes, average 
annual ratio of weapons exported per GNP, the frequency of civil war and interstate war, 
domestic capital formation, lagged dependent variable, and secondary school enrolment 
in 1970 (Davis et al., 1989). The military participation rate and weapons exports had 
positive impacts on economic development but had negative and insignificant impacts on 
political rights (Davis et al., 1989). The impact of the military regime and the peripheral 
position in the world system were strong and negative on political rights (Davis et al., 
1989).These results indicated that the different components of militarization affected 
development in different ways (Davis et al., 1989). Kick, Davis, Kiefer, and Burns (1998) 
conducted a very similar study on 65 developing countries. They added an additional 
dependent variable, secondary school enrollment ratio, and their independent variables 
were the initial state of three dependent variables, three militarization measures, namely, 
the numbers of soldiers per 1000, the count of the number of years of military rules, and 
averaged value of arms imports per capita, averaged value of net foreign investment per 
capita, world-system classification, and dummy variable for OPEC countries (Kick et al., 
1998). Results showed that military participation had a positive and significant impact on 
economic development and political rights but not significant on secondary school 
enrolment, and that military regime and arms import had a negative and significant 
impact on economic development and political rights but they were not significant on 
school enrolment (Kick et al., 1998). Being a poor periphery country has significant 
negative effects on GDP and political rights (Kick et al., 1998). These two studies 
showed that being poor periphery country has a negative impact on the economy of 
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developing country. Another interesting result of these studies is that different 
militarization measures have different impacts on the developing countries. Bullock and 
Firebaugh (1990) made a distinction between social militarization with more soldiers and 
economic militarization with more spending and hypothesized that social militarization 
promoted development while economic militarization hindered it (Bullock & Firebaugh, 
1990). Their results supported the first hypothesis that military participation had a strong 
positive impact on economic development, while they failed to support the second 
hypothesis because coefficients on military spending were not statistically significant 
even though the sign was an expected negative sign (Bullock & Firebaugh, 1990). 
The second half of a study by Faini et al. (1984) is another example of the 
structuralist approach to analyze military expenditures in developing countries. They 
attempted to conduct a consistent analysis of effect of military expenditure on diverse 
aspects of development using uniform set of regression equations. They added military 
burden as an additional explanatory variable to the regression model developed by 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) as following: 
 X = α + β1 ln(Y/P) + β2 {ln(Y/P)}2 + β3 ln(P) + β3 {ln(P)}2 
                           + β5(F) + β6(M) + dummy variables + ε                                  (2.1) 
where X = dependent variables, Y = GDP, P = population in thousands, Y/P = GDP per 
capita, F = net financial inflow (imports of goods and services minus exports of goods 
and services), M = military burden (military expenditure as % of GDP), dummy variables 
for 5-year time period, and ε = error term (Faini et al., 1984). They took a series of 
dependent variables that reflects developmental concern of structuralism, namely, 
investments, imports, industrial output, agricultural output, and tax receipt, all as shares 
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of GDP (Faini et al., 1984). Their results showed that military burden had significant and 
negative impacts on investment and agriculture, and a significant and positive impact on 
tax receipt, but no significant influence on imports and industrial production (Faini et al., 
1984). They chose only five dependent variables out of 27 dependent variables in original 
study by Chenery and Syrquin (1975). These dependent variables of Chenery and 
Syrquin cover investment and savings, education, consumptions, production, trade, 
employment, urbanization and population change, and income distributions (Chenery & 
Syrquin, 1975). After estimating regression equations for all dependent variables, 
Chenery and Syrquin ran simulations by putting different levels of per capita income 
back into each equation (with population of 10 million), and claimed to find “patterns of 
development” for each dependent variables (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). Faini et al. 
(1984) did not attempt to find “patterns” like Chenery and Syrquin did. It is very useful to 
run regression to find relationships of military expenditures to all these dependent 
variables, but putting arbitrary per capita income back into equations with an arbitrary 
population level of 10 million is not a very useful exercise. Also, another weak point of 
this approach is the fact that it is more empirical than theoretical. In spite of these 
weaknesses, the approach by Chenery and Syrquin is still very useful to examine the 
relationships between military expenditure and all dependent variables that are significant 
for economic development. This approach covers many of structuralists’ concerns, such 
as dualism and urbanization, industrialization, employment, composition of consumption, 
production, trade, and demographic transition and income distribution. Chenery and 
Syrquin (1975) argued that by using this simple uniform set of regression equations for 
all development processes and their dependent variables, they were able to avoid 
32 
 
difficulties in combining various results into a consistent analysis. Therefore, this model 
can be a solution to the problem of having inconsistent sometimes opposing results by 
using so many different approaches.  
This dissertation will follow their approach, with some modifications, to examine 
the impact of military expenditures on economic development in developing countries. 
Deger and Smith (1983) listed four possible channels through which military expenditure 
may influence the economy: resource allocation and mobilization, organization of 
production, sociopolitical structure, and external relations. Combining these channels 
with the list of dependent variables of Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and taking a broader 
definition of development into consideration, this dissertation will have the following 17 
dependent variables in the analysis. The resource allocation channel includes investment, 
savings, private and public consumption, and education and health spending. Production 
and trade (external relations) channels include agricultural and industrial production, 
unemployment rate, export and import, and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
socioeconomic channel includes urbanization rate, income distribution, and physical 
quality of life (life expectancy, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate). 
The table in Appendix A organizes all past studies mentioned in this dissertation 
into categories. 






RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA SET 
 
 As mentioned earlier in the Introduction, research questions for this dissertation 
are the following: What is the nature of the impact of military expenditure on economic 
development in the developing countries? What are the opportunity costs of increased 
spending? What will be the policy implications from these analyses? In order to answer 
these questions, the following regression equation and data set will be used. 
 
3.1 Regression Equation 
 Equation 2.1 in the study by Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984) was based on the 
equation developed by Chenery and Syrquin (1975). Chenery and Syrquin argued that  
intercountry comparisons played an essential part in understanding the processes of 
economic and social development, and that their study was an attempt to provide a 
uniform analysis of a mechanism of structural transformation instead of applying 
independent, different methodologies, hypotheses, and data to each separate process 
because of difficulties to combine these diverse results into a consistent picture of 
development as a whole or to trace interrelations among separate processes (Chenery & 
Syrquin, 1975). By introducing military burden in this equation, Faini et al. (1984) tried 
to examine the effects of military expenditure on the process of structural transformation 
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in the developing countries. This dissertation will modify Equation 2.1 slightly to include 
a new variable, KOF Globalization Index, which captures the level of globalization for 
each country every year, in place of a 5-year time period dummy variable that was 
decided arbitrarily by Chenery and Syrquin. Any major shifts in the world should be 
reflected in the yearly change in the globalization index, which consists of economic, 
social, and political dimensions of globalization. The equation also includes country 
dummy variables to allow separate intercept for each country to perform the fixed effect 
model analysis. It will also include a time lag of 10 years for all independent variables to 
allow time for slowly evolving determinants to come to equilibrium and to mitigate 
simultaneity bias. Nonlinearity included in Chenery and Syrquin equation was dropped as 
well. Jameson argued that “over a twenty-year period, it is unlikely that there would be 
any marked non-linearity in the relation, and co-linearity of the linear and squared terms 
affects the results” (Jameson, 1982, p. 435). The regression equation for this study is 
following: 
X = α + β1 (Mt-10) + β2 (Gt-10) + β3 (Ft-10) + β4 (Yt-10/Pt-10) + β5(Pt-10)  
                                 + country dummy + ε                                                        (3.1) 
where X = dependent variables, M = military burden (military expenditure as % of GDP), 
G = KOF globalization index, F = net financial inflow (imports of goods and services 
minus exports of goods and services, as % of GDP), Y = GDP, P = population in millions, 
Y/P = GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $ in thousands), country dummy = n-1 country 
dummy variables for the fixed effect model, and ε = error term.  
Per capita GDP serves as an overall index of development as well as a measure of 
output (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). Deger and Smith (1983) included the level of per 
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capita income in their analysis to capture any “catch-up” effects. “The higher the per 
capita income, the smaller the gap between domestic technology and world best-practice 
technology and the lower the scope for rapid growth through imported technology” 
(Deger & Smith 1983, pp. 341-342). The population was included to allow for the effects 
of economies of scale (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). According to Taylor (1969), 
population is interpreted as a proxy for the effects of threshold size barriers to growth in 
certain industries and the influence of trade patterns, which are closely tied to country 
size. At each income level, larger countries have less trades and less specialization than 
smaller countries do (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). Deger and Smith (1983) included the 
population in their analysis as a proxy for labor.  
In Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Faini et al. (1984), per capita GDP and 
population are taken natural logarithms and squared. Chenery and Syrquin argued that the 
major features of structural transformation could be represented with an S-shaped curve 
that was characterized with an upper and lower asymptote, meaning that many countries 
experienced a period in which the rate of change had accelerated following an earlier 
period of little structural change (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). However, they chose a 
quadratic function instead of a logistic function, which is required to describe the S-
shaped curve. The quadratic function describes only a small portion of the S-shaped 
curve depending on the signs on coefficients of natural logarithmic term and its square 
term. They justified this choice of quadratic function on the basis of lack of sufficient 
data (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). Not only their choice of a quadratic function is 
questionable, but also their insistence on nonlinearity is also questionable. As mentioned 
earlier, Jameson (1982) questioned nonlinearity and his results proved against 
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nonlinearity. Multicollinearity between logarithmic terms and their square terms is a 
serious problem for population. In addition, the use of a logarithmic term and its square 
term makes the interpretation of estimated coefficients of these terms on dependent 
variables very difficult, because almost all dependent variables are measured in different 
units, either the share of GDP or the ratio. It is, therefore, easier to interpret the result 
with simple raw numbers for per capita income and population, and Equation 3.1 
includes them instead of the logarithmic term and its square term. 
The net financial inflow affects directly or indirectly a number of development 
processes (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975). Deger and Smith (1983) argued that foreign 
capital inflow increases growth through financing investment. It is defined as imports of 
goods and services minus exports of goods and services, as % of GDP, thus it is the 
current account deficit. In the balance of payments, that is capital account surplus, even 
though there can be accounting discrepancy in real life. According to the textbook of 
World Trade and Payments, running current account deficit, in other words, capital 
account surplus can sometimes be beneficial for some developing countries (Caves, 
Frankel & Jones, 2002).  
Developing countries sometimes run large trade deficits. This practice can be 
perfectly appropriate if they are growing rapidly and need, for example, to import 
capital goods in order to invest in plant and equipment. Such countries are 
necessarily borrowing from abroad to finance their current account deficits. If 
they are spending the funds well, they will in the future have the level of capital 
stock, particularly export capacity, necessary to generate export earnings with 
which to repay that debt. (Caves et al., 2002, p. 291)  
 
Therefore, this (import - export) current account deficit can have a potential 
positive impact on the future economic development of the developing country. 
The KOF Globalization Index is published by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
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(2016) at ETH Zurich. It measures the rate of globalization in countries around the world. 
The index is based on three dimensions: economic, social, and political. Dreher (2006) 
found that globalization promoted economic growth, especially globalization in economic 
flows and restrictions, and in information flows even though it was not as robust as 
economic globalization. This yearly index reflects each country’s global position at the 
time so much better than arbitrary time period dummy variables which were in the study 
by Faini et al. (1984) and Chenery and Syrquin (1975). As it turned out, it has very strong 
explanatory power as well. Therefore, it is a very good control variable to be included in 
the regression equation. 
The military burden, military expenditure as % of GDP, is a military expenditure 
variable in this equation. It is a good indicator of the economic burden military 
expenditure places on the economy of the developing countries. Deger and Smith (1983) 
used it to reflect the level of modernization in the economy. In their model, both military 
expenditure and per capita income act as proxies for the rate of technical change (Deger 
& Smith, 1983).  
The equation also includes n-1 country dummy variables where n = numbers of 
countries, to make it the fixed effect model. The fixed effect model makes it possible to 
control for variables that have not or cannot be measured (Allison, 2009). Any 
unobserved variables that do not change over time should be captured by this model by 
allowing each country to have its own separate intercept (Allison, 2009). Appendix B 
shows different selection criteria between the fixed effect model with country dummy 
variables and the pooled model without country dummy variables. Adjusted R2 are much 
higher for the fixed effect model than the pooled model. Both Akaike Information 
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Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are much smaller for the fixed 
effect model than the pooled model. Therefore, the selection of the fixed effect model 
over the pooled model is justified. 
All independent variables, except dummy variables, are lagged 10 years to allow 
time for these macroeconomic variables to take impacts on the economy since our 
theoretical view of development in this analysis has a longer run interpretation. This also 
makes the model recursive, instead of a simultaneous model, to avoid simultaneity bias. 
Joerding (1986) found no Granger causality from military spending to economic growth, 
but found that economic growth Granger caused military spending. However, Babin 
(1989) argued that if enough time was given, military expenditures could have an impact 
on national economy. He argued that “at the national level, development usually requires 
series of changes that occur through systems, which involve organizations, agencies, 
economic structures, and technological programs (Babin, 1989, p. 249). In other words, 
economic changes at the aggregate usually involve technological and institutional 
changes that take time, and also the effect of defense spending on the economy is 
probably indirect and involves substantial time lags (Babin, 1989). Therefore, the impact 
of defense spending should be considered in the same way as other developmental 
processes by taking the time factor into consideration. Babin found significant impact of 
military expenditures on the economy when the military expenditures variables were 
lagged 11 years and 16 years (Babin, 1989). Also, Deger (1992) stressed the necessity to 
include explicitly lagged military expenditure in the analysis in the following quote: 
If military spending does reduce growth and create distortions, it probably does so 
over extended periods of time. Moreover, the adverse impact of defense on 
development becomes stronger with time, since there is an element of cumulation 





There is a need for the models with explicitly lagged effects of military expenditures.  
According to Greene (1997), various procedures have been suggested to 
determine the appropriate lag length, including adjusted R2, and AIC. Appendix B also 
shows these criteria for different lag length, namely, 1 year, 5 year, and 10 year. The 
equation with 10-year lag has generally the highest adjusted R2 (in 10 cases out of 17) 
and the lowest AIC (in all 17 cases) and the lowest SBC (in 16 cases). This result is fairly 
close to Babin’s conclusion of 11-year lag (Babin, 1989). Therefore, all independent 
variables are lagged 10 years in the analysis. Estimated coefficients for military burden 
with t-values are included in Appendix B to show if there is any difference in those 
coefficients depending on which different models are used, the fixed effect model, pooled 
model, 1-year lag, 5-year lag, and 10-year lag. 
As mentioned earlier, by combining channels through which military expenditure 
may influence the economy and the list of dependent variables of Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975) and taking a broader definition of development into consideration, this dissertation 
will have the following 17 dependent variables in the analysis. The resource allocation 
channel includes investment, savings, private and public consumption, and education and 
health spending. Production and trade (external relations) channels include agricultural 
and industrial production, unemployment rate, export and import, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The socioeconomic channel includes urbanization rate, income 
distribution, and physical quality of life (life expectancy, literacy rate, and infant 
mortality rate). Table 3.1 shows a list of these 17 dependent variables.  




Resource Allocation Channels Production and Trade Channels Socioeconomic Channels 
Gross Capital Formation Agriculture Value Added Urbanization Rate 
Gross Domestic Savings Industry Value Added Gini Coefficient 
Household Consumption Unemployment Rate Life Expectancy 
Government Consumption Exports Literacy Rate 
Public Spending on Education Imports Mortality Rate 




Indicators published by the World Bank (2004, 2012). Gross capital formation (gross 
domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy 
plus net changes in the level of inventories, measured as % of GDP. Gross domestic 
savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption), 
measured as % of GDP. Household final consumption expenditure (private consumption) 
is the market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, 
washing machines, and home computers), purchased by households, measured as % of 
GDP. General government final consumption expenditure (government consumption) 
includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees), measured as % of GDP. It also includes most 
expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Public expenditure on 
education consists of current and capital public expenditure on education that includes 
government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), education 
administration, as well as subsidies for private entities, measured as % of GDP. Public 
health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central 
Table 3.1 List of Dependent Variables 
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and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants, and social health insurance funds, 
measured as % of GDP. Agriculture value added includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, 
as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production, measured as % of GDP. Industry 
value added includes manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas, measured 
as % of GDP. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. Unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force 
that is without work but available for and seeking employment, measured as % of total 
labor force. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the rest of the world, measured as % of GDP. Imports of 
goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received 
from the rest of the world, measured as % of GDP. Foreign direct investments are the net 
inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 % or more of voting 
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments, measured as % of GDP. Urban population 
(% of total population) refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, 
in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents 
perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Life expectancy at birth 
indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Adult literacy 
rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and 
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write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Infant mortality rate is the number 
of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year (The 
World Bank, 2004, 2012). Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables, 
including numbers of observations, minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation. 
Most variables are either rates or as % of GDP. Some variables have more than four 
thousand observations, but a few variables have less than a thousand observations, 
especially some socioeconomic variables, such as Gini coefficient and literacy rate. 
 
 




Observations Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Military Burdena 4368 0.01 57.77 3.0335 3.66339
KOF Globalization Index 3930 12.89 88.61 42.9746 14.58575
Net Financial Inflowa 4424 -81.7 162.55 4.7873 15.33821
GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US$ in thousands) 4546 o.o6 61.38 2.8245 5.61215
Population (in millions) 4554 0.07 1338.3 35.2296 128.52109
Gross Capital Formationa 4343 -17.38 76.69 21.733 8.6118
Gross Domestic Savingsa 4375 -142.55 80.48 16.6735 15.18161
Household Consumptiona 4359 11.01 227.98 68.6503 15.88322
Government Consumptiona 4401 2.05 76.22 14.6096 6.41619
Health Spendinga 1768 0.00 8.2 2.8339 1.43273
Education Spendinga 1182 0.00 49.52 4.3225 2.7901
Agriculture Value Addeda 4241 0.04 93.98 22.5758 15.28925
Industry Value Addeda 4234 1.88 90.51 30.2898 12.84873
Unemployment Rate 1362 0.2 59.5 9.1038 6.34037
Exportsa 4424 2.09 234.35 33.9438 24.78714
Importsa 4428 2.98 212.49 38.7934 25.10066
Foreign Direct Investmenta 3879 -82.89 90.74 2.6739 5.44113
Urbanization Rate 4557 2.08 100 44.8205 22.9838
Gini Coefficient 725 20.96 74.33 43.0154 10.09421
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 4538 26.82 81.64 60.1429 10.97557
Adult Literacy Rate 373 9.39 99.79 74.222 23.17433
Infant Mortality Rate 4439 2.1 221.6 66.1106 44.93055
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Note: Superscript a indicates that a variable is measured as % of GDP. 
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3.2 Data Set and Its Sources 
 The data set for this dissertation consists of cross-sectional time-series data for 
119 countries over the period of 1960-2010. Table 3.3 shows the list of countries. There  
are 40 countries from Africa, 24 countries from Asia and Oceania, 21 countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe, 19 countries from Latin America, and 15 countries from the 
Middle East and North Africa. For some countries and for some variables, the data are 
not a complete set but only a partial set because the data for the entire period are not 
available. Nevertheless, this data set is much larger than most past studies, and it allows 
this study to be a cross-sectional time-series data analysis instead of stationary cross-
sectional analysis at some point in time. The military expenditure data are taken from 
multiple issues of SIPRI Yearbook (between 1969 and 2012 issues) published by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The current issue is available 
online from their website at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex 
_database. The data for KOF globalization index are published by the KOF Swiss 
Economic Institute (2016) at ETH Zurich, which is available online at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. The data for all other variables are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (2004, 2012) published by the World Bank. The current issue is 
available online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
An electronic copy of this data set in Excel format is attached to this dissertation. 
The next three chapters will present regression results. Chapter 4 will present 
results for resource allocation channels. Chapter 5 will present results for production and 
trade channels. Chapter 6 will present results for socioeconomic channels. Concluding 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 
 
 “Military expenditures divert resources from other uses and so have direct 
opportunity costs in terms of foregone investment, consumption, and so on” (Deger & 
Smith, 1983, p. 337). Therefore, in the absence of excess production capacity or domestic 
arms industry, military expenditure should have negative impact on economy. This 
chapter will examine the nature of impact of military expenditure on resource allocation 
processes, namely on investment and savings, consumption, and education and health 
spending. Table 4.1 shows results of regression analyses, including estimated coefficients 
and t-values (in parentheses). 
 
4.1 Investment and Savings 
 The hypothesis in terms of the relationship between military expenditure and 
investment and savings is that the military expenditure will crowd out, at least partially, 
investment and savings. Results in Table 4.1 indicate that the hypothesis stands for 
savings but does not stand for investment. The estimated coefficient for military burden 
in the investment equation is positive but statistically insignificant. The estimated 
coefficient for military burden in the savings equation is expected negative sign and 









their t-values on military burden for equations with different time lags, namely 1-year and 
5-year lags. It shows that the effect of military burden on investment is positive and 
significant in the short run. The effect of military burden on savings in the short run 
remains negative and significant. These results show positive effect on investment in the 
short run and negative effect on savings in both the short and long run. These results 
seem to contradict each other and were unexpected, but consistent negative effects on 
savings suggest that the military burden may have negative effects on capital formation in 
the long run. The estimated coefficients of the globalization index are negative on 
investment and positive on savings but they are not statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficients of financial resource inflow are positive and significant on both investment 
and savings, which is not surprising because more financial resources are available for 






















.012              
(.267)
-.030                
(-1.458)
.036              
(2.308)***
-.226             
(-2.973)***
.032              
(5.164)*** .521 2549 118




-.155             
(-2.744)***
.032                 
(1.240)
.078              
(4.039)***
.443            
(4.670)***
.027          
(3.496)*** .772 2555 119




-.015             
(-.278)
-.037                
(-1.466)
-.029             
(-1.557)
-.367             
(-4.028)***
-.030             
(-4.035)*** .806 2545 119




.174              
(6.091)***
.007                 
(.516)
-.053             
(-5.408)***
-.079             
(-1.643)
.003              
(.728) .687 2547 119




.094              
(4.605)***
.029                 
(3.734)***
-.004             
(-.635)
.006               
(.179)
.001              
(.276) .775 914 113
.087 (4.344)***     
.096 (4.167)***
Health Spending
.050              
(3.532)***
.032                 
(8.706)***
-.003             
(-1.526)
-.029             
(-1.224)
-.000             
(-.189) .845 1459 118
.062 (3.528)***     
.003 (.144)
Table 4.1 Results for Resource Allocation 
Note: The t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at 99%, ** at 95%, and * at 90%. 
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estimated coefficients on GDP per capita are negative on investment and positive on 
savings and both are significant. The negative effect of higher GDP per capita on 
investment may indicate the upper limit of absorptive capacity of developing countries, 
that is, the inability of these countries to absorb extra capital due to the factors such as the 
lack of supply of skilled labor, administrative capacity, and entrepreneurship in these 
developing countries (Deger & Smith, 1983). The higher GDP per capita, on the other 
hand, will make more funds available for these countries to save, thus it has a positive 
and significant effect on savings. The estimated coefficients on population are positive 
and significant on both investment and savings. With higher population, more labor 
becomes available, which may raise absorptive capacity to encourage more investment. 
Also, higher population increases the size, which may push the country to go over the 
threshold size barriers in certain industries. That would lead to increase in investment as 
well. Explanatory powers of these equations are moderately high with R2 of .521 for 
investment and .772 for savings. The estimated coefficients for country dummies for the 
fixed effect model are not shown here.  
 The negative result for savings equation is consistent with most past studies. 
Deger and Smith (1983) found negative and significant effect of military expenditure on 
savings. Similar results are found in Deger (1986), Scheetz (1991), Scheetz (2002), and 
Galvin (2003). Dunne, Nikolaidou, and Roux (2000) and Sezgin (2001) found negative 
but not significant results.  
 Looney (1994) found similar result to this dissertation. He found positive impact 
of military expenditure on investment and negative on savings. This result will give a 
country a policy dilemma. 
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The standard measures for accelerating growth - curbing defense expenditures and 
expanding non-defense - would, given the current macroeconomic environment, 
actually result in a fall in GDP. On the other hand, increases in defense 
expenditures, while generally expanding private investment, have often reduced 
gross national savings thus limiting somewhat the longer run effectiveness of this 
source of growth. (Looney, 1994, p. 424) 
 
Stewart (1991) and Cohen, Stevenson, Mintz, and Ward (1996) also found a positive 
impact of military expenditure on investment. They argued that this positive effect of 
military expenditure on investment will lead to its indirect positive impact on economic 
growth. However, Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984) and Smith (1980) found a negative 
and significant effect of military expenditure on investment. In their analyses, there are 
negative opportunity costs in terms of decreased investment as the hypothesis suggested. 
Looney (1989) divided developing countries into arms producing and arms nonproducing 
and found that military expenditure has a positive effect on investment in arms producing 
countries and negative effect in nonproducing countries. He argued that there is positive 
effect of military expenditure on investment due to direct linkages in arms producing 
countries (Looney, 1989). On the other hand, a larger proportion of increased military 
expenditures are likely to wind up in imported weapons in nonproducing countries, thus 
reducing investment (Looney, 1989).  
Even though results for investment are mixed, consistently negative results for 
savings suggest that in the longer run, the increase in military expenditure will reduce 
capital formation, and hamper economic growth in developing countries. 
 
4.2 Consumption 
 Two hypotheses in this section are that the effect of military expenditure is 
negative on private consumption by crowding it out, and that it is positive on government 
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consumption since military expenditure is part of government expenditure. Results in 
Table 4.1 show a negative but insignificant effect on household consumption, and a 
positive and significant effect on government consumption. It partially gives support to 
the hypotheses, even though the result for household consumption is not statistically 
significant. The last column of the table shows that the estimated coefficient for military 
burden on household consumption is negative and significant with 1-year lag, and 
negative but not significant with 5-year lag. The signs are negative for all three time lags. 
These results suggest that the negative effect of military expenditure on household 
consumption is very short run, and its effect fades away in the longer run. The same table 
also shows that a positive and significant effect of military burden on government 
consumption is present in all three time lags. This result suggests that increased military 
expenditure crowds out private consumption in the short run, and increased government 
consumption by increased military expenditure will divert savings away from productive 
investment. The estimated coefficient on globalization index is negative but not 
significant on household consumption and positive but insignificant on government 
consumption. The estimated coefficients on financial resource inflow and GDP per capita 
are negative and significant on both consumptions. It seems that increased availability of 
funds from increased financial resource inflow and increased output does not lead to 
increased consumptions. Instead, increases in these two variables seem to increase 
savings, indicating the lack of opportunity and commodities to consume in most 
developing countries. The estimated coefficient on population is negative and significant 
on household consumption and positive but insignificant on government consumption. 
Explanatory powers of these equations are high with R2 of .806 for household 
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consumption and .687 for government consumption. 
 Looney (1989) examined the effects of military expenditures on private and 
public consumptions in arms producing and nonproducing countries. In nonproducing 
countries, military expenditure has a positive and strong effect on private consumption, 
and it has a negative and significant effect in arms producing countries. In an arms 
producing country, increased military expenditure will lead to higher investment in the 
arms producing capital intensive sector, which leads to a squeeze on the wage goods 
sector by diverting capacity from them, thus lowering private consumption (Looney, 
1989). In that situation, “only the poor lose by slow growth of production in commodities 
suited to their needs” (Looney, 1989, p. 147). For public consumption, his results show a 
strong positive linkage between the military expenditure and public consumption in arms 
producing countries, and an insignificant linkage in nonproducing countries (Looney, 
1989).  
 These results indicate that increase in military expenditure has an overall negative 
impact on economy by squeezing private consumption in the short run, and diverting 
savings through increased government consumption.  
 
4.3 Education and Health Spending 
 Education and health spending play significant roles in the human capital 
accumulation process. Therefore, analyzing their relationship with military expenditure is 
very important for economic development. Military expenditure and education/health 
spending are all part of government spending. Are they substitutes or complements? It is 
hard to determine either way a priori. If they are substitutes, they will compete for their 
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share of government budget with each other, hence there will be “guns vs. butter” 
negative tradeoffs. Looney (1990), Apostolakis (1992), and Ozsoy (2002) found a strong 
negative impact of military expenditures on both education and health. However, “in 
many developing countries, the military is intimately involved in the provision of 
education and health services, particularly in rural areas” (Looney, 1990, p. 9). In that 
case, military expenditure and education/health spending are complements. To modernize 
the economy, the military and education/health can be interdependent in contributing to 
economic development (Babin, 1990). Also in many developing countries, “the military 
organization was often the only functioning bureaucratic organization in societies which 
lacked effective operating institutions” (Babin, 1990, p. 270). Adeola (1996), and Yildrim 
and Sezgin (2002) found mixed result with positive results on education but negative on 
health. In order to accommodate these complicated effects of military expenditure on 
education and health spending, Adeola (1996) suggested the following hypotheses: 
military expenditures, education, and health spending are allies (or complements) to 
modernization and economic development; or military expenditures, education, and 
health spending are substitutes in economic development. 
 Results in Table 4.1 show that there are strong positive impacts of military 
expenditure on both education and health. This indicates that there are positive tradeoffs 
instead of negative tradeoffs, thus there are no “guns vs. butter” tradeoffs and military 
spending can be thought of as complementary with health and education spending. 
The last column of the table shows positive results for all time lags for education and 
health except an insignificant result for 5-year lag for health. The estimated coefficients 
on globalization index are positive and significant on both education and health. All other 
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independent variables are not statistically significant. Explanatory powers of these 
equations are very high with R2 of .775 for education spending and .845 for health 
spending. 
 This result of positive impacts of military expenditure on education and health is 
consistent with results by Verner (1983), Harris, Kelly, and Pranowo (1988), and Babin 
(1990).  Even though past studies show very mixed results concerning the effect of 
military expenditure on education and health spending, significant positive results of this 
dissertation suggest that military expenditure seems to contribute to economic 
development by promoting human capital accumulation through positive impact on 
education and health spending.  
 
4.4 Summary 
 Regression results in this chapter show that the increase in military expenditure 
has significant negative impact on savings, and on private consumption in the short run. It 
has an indirect negative effect on savings as well by positively affecting government 
consumption, which in turn crowds out savings. Even though it does not have significant 
effect on investment, its direct and indirect negative effect on savings will have a 
negative impact on capital formation in developing countries. On the other hand, the 
military expenditure turned out to be a complementary to education and health spending 
instead of being a substitute. That means it plays a positive role in human capital 
formation in developing countries, but less so for physical capital formation. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
 
 
  An increase in military expenditure can influence the production of a developing 
country by introducing modern technology, training technical skills to soldiers, and 
increasing employment, or by crowding out investment. It also can affect trade by 
increasing arms imports and crowding out nonarms imports and exports. It can have 
impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) by sending signals to potential 
foreign investors. This chapter will examine these impacts of military expenditure. Table 
5.1 shows results of these regression analyses. 
 
5.1 Agricultural and Industrial Production 
 Structuralists consider industrialization as the most important process in economic 
development of developing countries. In addition, a dualistic economy has to modernize 
the traditional agricultural sector to become a modern industrialized economy. Therefore, 
these two sectors are very significant for the economic development in the developing 
countries. The military expenditure can crowd out agricultural investment, which in turn 
reduces food production and increases poverty (Deger, 1992). If that happens, the 
negative opportunity costs of military expenditure will hurt the whole economy. The 









improving rural infrastructures, such as road and water supply. The hypothesis of this 
dissertation is that the crowding out by the military expenditure will outweigh the 
possible positive effects on agricultural production. Similarly, the industrial sector can 
either get crowded out by the military expenditures or get positive effects of 
modernization. The hypothesis of this dissertation is an overall negative effect of military 
expenditure on industrial sector.  
 The regression results show that the hypothesis on industrial production was 
supported, but the hypothesis on agricultural production was rejected even though it is 
statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient on military burden in the agriculture 
value added equation is positive with 88% statistical significance. It seems positive 
effects outweigh the negative effects in the long run. The last column of the table shows 
the results for short run analyses, and the signs of coefficients for 1-year and 5-year lags 
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.002               
(.337)
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(19.608)***
.032           
(1.443)
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.015               
(1.672)* .908 2570 119
.119 (1.990)**       
.116 (1.821)*
Imports
.197               
(2.690)***
.524                  
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-.016          
(-.628)
-.028            
(-.226)
.019               
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-.094             
(-.2.502)**
.133                  
(7.641)***
-.014          
(-1.085)
-.010            
(-.159)
-.002              
(-.460) .253 2590 119
-.047 (-1.699)*       
-.058 (-1.900)*
Table 5.1 Results for Production and Trade 
Note: The t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at 99%, ** at 95%, and * at 90%. 
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significant negative effects on agricultural production, especially globalization index and 
population have negative and significant impacts on agriculture. It seems that countries 
with increasing population and higher integration into the global economy tend to neglect 
the agricultural sector.  
 The estimated coefficient of military burden on industry value added is negative 
and significant, indicating the military expenditure significantly crowds out industrial 
production. The last column of the table shows that the sign of the coefficient for 5-year 
lag is negative and significant and negative and insignificant for 1-year lag. The 
estimated coefficient of net financial inflow is positive and significant for industrial 
production. Higher net financial resources means that more financial resources are 
available for industry to invest, which in turn leads to higher production for the industry 
sector. Other independent variables are not statistically significant. Explanatory powers 
of these equations are very high with R2 of .908 for agriculture value added and .826 for 
industry value added. The estimated coefficients for country dummies for the fixed effect 
model are not shown here. 
 Results of Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984) are opposite of the results of this 
dissertation. The estimated coefficients on military burden are negative and significant 
for agriculture and positive but insignificant for industry. Different results may be caused 
by their lack of consideration of time factor in their analyses. Their analyses are done 
only for the short run, while this dissertation’s focus is long run, and that difference 
might have caused a difference in results. They argued that increased military 
expenditures are associated with the shift in economic activity from the agricultural 
sector to industry (Faini et al., 1984). Since their result on industry is not statistically 
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significant, their conclusion is not robust. The result of this dissertation shows significant 
negative impact of military expenditure on industry with 10-year and 5-year lags. 
Combined with negative result on savings in Chapter 4, this result indicates that the 
expansion of military expenditure is detrimental to industrialization in developing 
countries. The results for agriculture is mixed, therefore it is not clear how the military 
expenditure will affect agricultural development in developing countries. It all depends 
on which effect, negative crowding-out effect or positive effect on technology and 
infrastructure, is more dominant in these developing countries. 
 
5.2 Employment 
 Expansion of military expenditure can increase employment as large numbers of 
workers are employed either directly by military-related operations or in a supporting role 
or in the services sector around military bases (Yildrim & Sezgin, 2003). Increase in 
military expenditure can alleviate a reduction in civilian jobs during economic downturn 
by absorbing unskilled workers (Henry & Oliver, 1987). In addition, if the increase in 
military expenditure raises effective demand in the economy, output will go up, which in 
turn will increase the employment in the economy. However, if the increase in the 
military expenditure is mostly aimed at advanced, high technology, labor-saving weapons 
systems, the increase in employment will be much smaller (Yildrim & Sezgin, 2003). 
Since most developing countries do not spend a lot of money on highly advanced 
weapons systems with a few exceptions of very rich developing countries, the hypothesis 
of this dissertation is that there is significant positive effect of military expenditure on 
employment in developing countries. 
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 The result in Table 5.1 shows that the estimated coefficient on military burden in 
unemployment equation is negative and significant, indicating that an increase in military 
expenditure will increase employment in developing countries. The last column of the 
table shows the same result in shorter terms as well. It shows that military burden has 
significant negative effects on unemployment rate both in 5-year and 1-year lags. The 
globalization index also has significant negative effect on unemployment, indicating that 
the more globally integrated the country is, the more employment the country can 
generate. On the other hand, the population has a significant positive effect on 
unemployment rate, which indicates that the lager the country is, the more unemployment 
there is. Per capita GDP also has a significant positive effect on unemployment rate. This 
result is rather counter-intuitive. This indicates that higher output will not lead to higher 
employment. If the increase in the output mainly happened in labor saving, capital 
intensive sectors, the increase in output may not lead to higher employment. Financial 
resource inflow does not have a significant effect on unemployment rate. Goodness of fit 
of the equation is high with R2 of .796. 
 This result is consistent with the result of the study by Azam, Khan, Zaman, and 
Rasli (2016). Their study of four South Asian countries revealed that the estimated 
coefficient of military expenditure has a negative and more elastic relationship with the 
unemployment rate, indicating that military expenditures favor the employment in these 
South Asian countries (Azam, Khan, Zaman, & Rasli, 2016).  
 On the other hand, a study by Yildrim and Sezgin (2003) shows that the second 
lag of military expenditure had a negative effect on employment in Turkey between 1950 
and 1997. However, their result with first lag shows the positive and significant effect on 
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employment, which is consistent with the result of this dissertation (Yildrim & Sezgin, 
2003). A study by Dunne and Watson (2000) also shows that the military expenditure had 
a detrimental impact on long-term manufacturing employment in South Africa between 
1961 and 1990.  
 Except results of Dunne and Watson (2000) and half of the results by Yildrim and 
Sezgin (2003), it seems that military expenditure has significant positive effects on 
employment in developing countries by absorbing unskilled workers, which gives these 
countries a tool to fight a high unemployment rate. 
 
5.3 Exports and Imports 
 Military expenditure may have negative impact on trade balances in developing 
countries. “Since an increase in defence spending increase aggregate demand, if there are 
domestic supply constraints, a rise may reduce exportable goods and/or may result in an 
increase in imports” (Sezgin, 2001, p. 77). Deger put this process in following words: 
 Defense spending increases aggregate demand. If the domestic supply is relatively  
inelastic, to accommodate this increased demand exports might have to be 
diverted for internal use and/or imports stepped up. Thus the balance of trade will  
 become adverse, and will exacerbate the existing deficits that most LDCs suffer  
 from. (Deger, 1986, p. 140) 
 
Therefore, the increase in military expenditure may crowd out exports and increase 
imports. This dissertation will follow this argument and hypothesize that the increase in 
military expenditure will crowd out exports and increase imports. However, military 
imports may crowd out civilian imports (Deger, 1992). If that is the case, there is a 
possibility that the increase of military expenditure may crowd out part of imports as well. 
These arguments are based on demand side arguments of crowding out, even though this 
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chapter discusses mostly the supply side argument of productions.  
 Results in Table 5.1 show that the effect of military expenditure is not significant 
on exports, but it is positive and significant on imports. The part of the hypothesis that the 
increase in military expenditure will increase imports is supported by this result, but there 
is no crowding out of exports in the result. As a matter of fact, results in the last column 
of the table show that effect of military expenditure on exports is actually positive and 
significant in the short term. The results also show that effect of military expenditure on 
imports is positive and significant in all three time lags. Thus, the increase in military 
spending has a significant positive impact on imports and positive impact on exports in 
the short run. The estimated coefficient on globalization index is positive and significant 
on both exports and imports. This result is not surprising. If the country is more 
globalized, it will engage in more trade, exporting and importing more goods and 
services. Per capita GDP and population also have positive and significant effect on 
exports. Population has positive and significant effect on imports as well. Per capita GDP 
is not significant on imports, and financial resource inflow is not significant on both 
exports and imports. Explanatory powers of these equations are very high with R2 of .908 
for exports and .878 for imports. 
 Deger (1986) shows that military burden has a significant negative effect on trade 
balance. Scheetz (1991) also has a similar result that the military expenditure has a 
significant negative effect on trade balance. These results of negative effects on trade 
balance are actually consistent with results of this dissertation. Since estimated 
coefficient on import is larger than that on export (.197 and .002), an increase in the 
military burden will increase more imports than exports, thus worsening the trade balance.  
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 Dunne, Nikolaidou, and Roux (2000) and Sezgin (2001) show a negative but 
insignificant effect on trade balance. The signs on these insignificant results are still 
negative, thus still consistent with the hypothesis of this dissertation. On the other hand, 
Faini et al. (1984) show a negative effect of military expenditure on imports, although it 
is statistically insignificant. 
 In terms of arms imports, Kiefer (2001) examined the effect of arms imports on 
the growth rate of per capita GDP by using single equation regression analysis on 115 
countries over the period of 1978-1988. Control variables include investment, population 
growth, size of armed forces, and size of government budget (Kiefer, 2001). The result 
shows that arms import has an expected negative sign, but it is not statistically significant 
(Kiefer, 2001). Army size has a positive and significant effect on economic growth 
(Kiefer, 2001). In light of this evidence, Kiefer concludes that the “more arms trade to 
slower development” claim remains possible but uncertain (Kiefer, 2001, p. 13). 
 
5.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 “FDI brings host countries capital, productive facilities, new technology and 
modern management know-how” (Hassan, Waheeduzzaman, & Rahman, 2003, p. 279). 
Thus, attracting FDI can be a significant part of the strategy to industrialize and 
modernize the economies of the developing countries. What kind of signals does the 
increase in military expenditure send to potential foreign investors? On the one hand, it 
will send a signal of a country’s commitment to internal and external security, which 
means FDI property rights may be secure in that country. On the other hand, it will also 
send a signal that the political and security environment surrounding the country may be 
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unstable. If the potential foreign investors perceive the risk is too high, they will avoid 
investing in that country. Whether the increase in military expenditure will attract or 
detract the FDI depends on which force outweighs the other. This dissertation 
hypothesizes that the increase in military expenditure sends a negative signal to potential 
foreign investors, since many developing countries are often involved in internal and 
external conflicts when they increase their military expenditures.  
 Table 5.1 shows that the estimated coefficient of military burden on FDI is indeed 
negative and significant, suggesting that the increase in military expenditure is sending a 
negative signal to potential foreign investors. The last column of the table shows the 
same result in the short run, although the statistical significances are slightly lower with 
5-year and 1-year lags. The globalization index has a significant positive effect on FDI. 
The more globalized the country is, the more foreign investors are willing to invest. The 
globalization index has a very significant positive impact on trades and FDI. Estimated 
coefficients of all remaining independent variables are not statistically significant, but 
signs are all negative. Goodness of fit of the equation is rather low with R2 of .253. 
 Hassan et al. (2003) ran regression on FDI for five countries in the South Asian 
Regional Cooperation Council between 1980 and 1999, and found the negative and 
significant relation between military expenditure and FDI. They also found a positive 
impact of globalization index on FDI. Therefore, their result is very consistent with the 
result of this dissertation. 
 Hite-Rubin (2015) investigated the relationship between military expenditure and 
FDI with consideration of corruption in the host country by including a corruption 
variable in her analysis. The result shows that the increase in military expenditure attracts 
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more FDI in perceived corrupt countries, but it reduces FDI inflow in noncorrupt 
countries (Hite-Rubin, 2015). A possible explanation is that increase in military 
expenditure will signal international investors that their investment assets are secure 
(Hite-Rubin, 2015). “Countries that are corrupt have inherently insecure institutional 
environments, and thus require the expensive signal of military spending to demonstrate 
to investors that the risk of seizure or conflict is minimized” (Hite-Rubin, 2015, p. 244). 
This interesting analysis, nonetheless, confirmed the result of this study, at least for 
noncorrupt countries. Under normal circumstances, the increase in military expenditure 
will reduce FDI inflow to developing countries. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 This chapter examined the effects of military expenditures on the production and 
trade. The military expenditures have negative effects on industrial output and foreign 
direct investment. On the other hand, the military expenditures have positive effects on 
employment and imports. Combined with results from Chapter 4 in terms of savings, the 
military expenditures seem to have a significant negative impact on capital formation 
through negative impacts on savings and FDI, which may be why the military 
expenditures have a negative impact on the industrial sector. Even though its positive 
effect on employment can be used as a tool to fight with the high unemployment rates in 
many developing countries, its significant negative impact on industrialization has to be 
taken into consideration by these countries. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
 An expanded structuralist definition of economic development includes many 
socioeconomic variables such as income equality and physical quality of life. Therefore, 
we cannot discuss the impact of military expenditures on economic development without 
discussing their impact on these socioeconomic variables. Are there “guns vs. butter” 
tradeoffs between military expenditures and these socioeconomic variables? This chapter 
will examine the impact of military expenditures on urbanization, income distribution, 
and the physical quality of life. Table 6.1 shows the regression results of these analyses. 
 
6.1 Urbanization 
 Urbanization, a migration of population from rural areas to urban areas, is a 
critical process in the structuralist analysis of industrialization. According to structuralists, 
the urbanization process provides necessary labor supply for industrialization for a 
developing country to become a modern economy. There is strong positive association 
between urbanization and income level of developing countries. “Generally, the more 
developed the country, measured by per capita income, the greater the share of 
population living in urban areas” (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 313). That is why 










an indicator of modernization. However, there was no study conducted so far on the 
relationship between military expenditure and urbanization. What will be the effect of 
military expenditures on urbanization? The results of this dissertation so far show that 
military expenditure has a positive impact on employment. The increase in employment 
brought by the increase in military expenditure may attract more labor to the area 
surrounding military installations, which are often near urban areas. However, military 
expenditure has a negative effect on industrial output, which may deter the migration of 
laborers. The hypothesis of this study is that potential increase in employment stimulated 
by the increase in military expenditure will attract more laborers to the area surrounding 
military installations near an urban area, thus military expenditure will have a positive 
impact on urbanization. 
 Results in Table 6.1 show that the estimated coefficient of military burden is 
positive and statistically significant, rejecting the null hypothesis. The last column of the 
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Table 6.1 Results for Socioeconomic Variables
Note: The t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at 99%, ** at 95%, and * at 90%. 
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it is positive in both short and long runs. Globalization index also has a significant 
positive effect on urbanization. The more globalized the country is, the more urbanized 
and modern that country is. Population also has a significant positive effect on 
urbanization. As the population in the country increases, the more people migrate to 
urban areas to look for jobs and better opportunity. GDP per capita also has a significant 
positive effect on urbanization, confirming the observation by Todaro and Smith (2006). 
Net financial inflow is the only independent variable with an insignificant result. 
Explanatory power of the equation is very high with R2 of .980. The estimated 
coefficients for country dummies for the fixed effect model are not shown here. 
 What does this positive relationship between military expenditure and 
urbanization mean to the economic development? It all depends on what developmental 
stages each country is in. It should have a positive effect in the countries at the early stage 
of economic development and industrialization, by supplying labor to the industry and 
services sectors. However, as countries developed further and their urban populations 
become larger, the increase in military expenditure may exacerbate the problems many 
developing countries face these days, such as urban crowding and congestion, and urban 
unemployment. The increase in the employment generated by the increase in the military 
expenditure may not be enough to alleviate the urban unemployment.  
 
6.2 Income Distribution 
 For most international developmental organizations, eliminating poverty and 
achieving more equal income distribution are the most important goals for economic 
development. What will be the impact of military expenditure on income distribution in 
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developing countries? Ali and Galbraith (2003) listed several possible impacts. It could 
be negative since the increase in the military expenditure may crowd out other 
government spending on social programs that have income equalizing effect (Ali & 
Galbraith, 2003). “Second, the taxes required to support military spending may fall 
disproportionately on the middle classes; if so post-tax income inequality may be 
increased” (Ali & Galbraith, 2003, p. 2). “Third, high levels of military spending may 
reflect the use of violence as a means of social control, notably against trade unions and 
other egalitarian social forces” (Ali & Galbraith, 2003, p. 2). On the other hand, there 
may be a positive impact of military expenditure on income distribution. “The military 
absorbs low-skilled labor, which may raise wages for the young and unskilled” (Ali & 
Galbraith, 2003, p. 2). They expect that if the military and home grown arms productions 
are more labor intensive, military spending is more income equalizing, and that if 
military spending is more capital and equipment intensive, it negatively affects the 
income equality (Ali & Galbraith, 2003). Their results show the positive effect of military 
expenditure on pay inequality, indicating that military expenditure adversely affects 
income distribution. Abell (1994) also found a strong negative effect of military 
expenditure on income distribution, even though his study was conducted on the United 
Sates instead of developing countries. Considering results of these studies, the hypothesis 
of this dissertation is that the increase in military expenditure will worsen the income 
distribution in developing countries. 
 The result in Table 6.1 shows that the estimated coefficient of military burden on 
Gini coefficient is negative but insignificant. The sign was opposite of expected, 
indicating that the increase in the military expenditure is somewhat income equalizing, 
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even though considerable uncertainty remains. The short-run result with 1-year lag also 
shows a negative but insignificant result. The equalizing effect of military spending on 
income distribution is consistent with its positive effect on employment. However, weak 
significance implies that other negative effects may be offsetting this positive effect. In 
addition, the result with 5-year lag shows an opposite sign but it is still statistically 
insignificant. The globalization index and GDP per capita also has negative signs but they 
are not statistically significant. Financial resource inflow has a positive and significant 
sign, indicating it has a negative impact on income distribution. Population also has a 
positive sign but it is not statistically significant. Explanatory power of the equation is 
very high with R2 of .900, which is surprising in light of the uncertainty about individual 
determinants. We remain doubtful about the impact of military spending on the 
distribution of income. 
  
6.3 Physical Quality of Life 
 Physical quality of life variables are life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, 
and infant mortality rate, accounting for an expanded definition of economic 
development and being used as a proxy for general social well-being. It is expected that 
government social spending will positively influence the physical quality of life. Since 
the increase in military expenditure may crowd out government social spending, the 
hypothesis of this dissertation is that the increase in the military expenditure negatively 
affects the physical quality of life in the developing countries; that is, there is a negative 
“guns vs. butter” tradeoff between them.  
 Results in Table 6.1 support this hypothesis. There is a significant negative 
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tradeoff between military expenditure and physical quality of life. The estimated 
coefficient of military burden on life expectancy is negative and significant. It is negative 
but insignificant on literacy rate. It is positive and significant on mortality rate, indicating 
that the increase in military expenditure will raise the infant mortality rate. All three 
results suggest that military expenditure reduces the physical quality of life in developing 
countries. The last column of the table shows that these negative results mostly extend to 
the short run as well, except three cases with statistically insignificant results. These 
negative results on physical quality of life seem to contradict the positive results on 
education and health spending in Chapter 4. A positive effect on education spending 
should affect literacy rate positively, and a positive effect on health spending should 
affect life expectancy positively and mortality rate negatively. One possible explanation 
is that the increase in military expenditure, education, and health spending may crowd out 
other government spending on social welfare and social safety net. Another explanation 
is that the relationship between military expenditure and the physical quality of life may 
be spurious. Such variables as military conflict, civil war, and social unrest can increase 
military expenditure, and worsen the physical quality of life. Such variables may be 
available from political science research, and the inclusion of those variables in future 
analysis as control variables may be beneficial.  
Globalization index and population have a very significant positive effect on 
physical quality of life. They have significant positive effects on life expectancy and 
literacy rate, and have significant negative effects on mortality rate, suggesting that 
globalization and population growth will increase general social well-being in developing 
countries independently of militarization. Financial resource inflow has a similar result 
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with a significant positive effect on life expectancy and a significant negative effect on 
mortality rate, but its effect is not significant on literacy rate. GDP per capita has a mixed 
result. It has a significant positive effect on life expectancy, but it has a significant 
negative effect on literacy rate and a significant positive effect on mortality rate. 
Explanatory powers of these equations are very high with R2 of .941 for life 
expectancy, .964 for literacy rate, and .939 for mortality rate. 
 This negative effect of military expenditure on physical quality of life can be 
found in studies by Adeola (1996) and Kim (1996). Both studies conclude that high  
military expenditures are inversely related to the physical quality of life. On the other 
hand, studies by Rosh (1986) and Davis and Chan (1990) found no significant effect of 
military expenditure on social welfare.  
 
6.4 Summary 
 Results in this chapter suggest that military expenditure negatively affects various 
dimensions of social well-being in the developing countries. Even though it may have a 
possible income equalizing effect, possibly through increased employment opportunities, 
its significant negative impact on physical quality of life may outweigh its positive effect 
on income distribution. Considering this strong negative impact on basic human needs, 
even its positive effect on urbanization may not have a positive impact on social well-
being. It may exacerbate problems of urban overpopulation, overcrowding, and 
unemployment, and may further decrease social well-being of these urban populations. 
Our structuralist view of development implies that the increase in the military 





 This dissertation tried to answer the following questions: What is the nature of the 
impact of military expenditure on economic development in the developing countries? 
What are the opportunity costs of military spending? What are the policy implications 
from these analyses?  
 Our regression results reveal that the nature of the impact of military expenditure 
on economic development is mostly negative. It has negative impacts on capital 
formation, industrialization, and social well-being. Structuralists and supply side theories 
pay particular attention to industrialization and capital formation because they are the 
most crucial factors of economic development for any developing country. Generalized 
well-being, measured by physical quality of life, is central to the expanded definition of 
economic development. Negative impact of military expenditure on these crucial aspects 
of broad definition of economic development is the most significant findings of this 
dissertation.  
On the other hand, there are some positive impacts of military expenditure on 
other aspects of economic development. It has positive effects on employment, 
government consumption, education and health spending, and imports. It also has a 
possible income equalizing effect as well.  
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From a demand side consideration, the opportunity costs of the increase in 
military expenditures are decreased gross domestic savings, decreased household 
consumption in the short run, decreased industrial output, decreased foreign direct 
investment, and decreased physical quality of life. These opportunity costs are very 
extensive and far reaching in the economies of developing countries. On the other hand, 
we do not find any evidence of negative opportunity costs between military expenditure 
and education and health spending, suggesting that they are allies not substitutes. 
However, that result indicates that some other government social spending must be 
sacrificed to pay these costs. They may be social welfare spending or some other social 
safety net spending. Military expenditure has positive effects on government 
consumption and imports as well. It may be simply because military expenditure is a part 
of government expenditure and arms import is a part of imports. The increase in 
government expenditure and imports may crowd out the savings and export sector. 
Military expenditure also has a negative effect on unemployment rate, indicating that it 
has a positive effect on employment. That suggests military expenditure can be used to 
absorb unskilled workers and help reduce unemployment rate. This result reduces other 
opportunity cost considerations associated with military spending. A positive effect on 
urbanization is ambiguous in terms of the relationship to economic development. It can 
be positive if it supplies labor for the industry, but it can be negative if it exacerbates 
many urban problems such as urban overcrowding and unemployment.  
 Overall, I conclude that the policy implication from this analysis is that the 
military expenditure should not be used as a tool for economic development in 
developing countries. It is not development promoting as Benoit (1973, 1978) suggested, 
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but it is actually development hampering given a broad interpretation of the development 
concept. It may have a power to absorb unskilled workers to alleviate unemployment rate 
and it may be equalizing the income distribution somewhat, but its negative impact 
reaches far greater aspects of economic development. Its negative impact on 
industrialization, capital formation, and physical quality of life means that the increase in 
military expenditure will not help promote economic development in the developing 
country.  
 I conclude that military expenditure has significant negative impacts on 
economies of developing countries.  
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37 LDCs with 
Resource Rich 
and Resource 
Poor 1950-1965 GDP Growth
Gross Capital Formation, Foreign Aid, Defense 
Burden
Positive for Resource Rich, 
Negative for Resource Poor
Demand Side Approach
Faini, Annez & 
Taylor (1984)
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Export Growth, Population Growth, Change in 
Military Burden, Capital Inflow Change, Capital 






Investment Share, Import 
Share
Government Spending, Defense Spending, 
Export Share, Investment Share, Capacity 
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countries 1954-1973 Investment Share
Military Expenditure Share, Growth Rate, 
Demand Pressure Negative
Supply Side Approach (Harrod-Domar)
Lim (1983)
Harrod-Domar 
Growth 54 LDCs 1965-1973 GDP Growth
Incremental Capital-output Ratio, Deficit on 
Current Account to Gross National Saving Ratio, 






American 1968-1973 GDP Growth
Incremental Capital-output Ratio, Deficit on 
Current Account to GDP Ratio, Defense Burden, 
Military Regime Negative
Supply Side Approach (Fedar-Ram)




Growth Model 58 LDCs 1969-1977 Growth
Investment, Military Spending, Externality, 
Factor Productivity Differential





Growth Model 74LDCs 1981-1989 Growth
Investment, Military Spending, Externality, 
Factor Productivity Differential Overall Positve




8 Asian and 16 
Latin American 1955-1988 GDP Growth
Investment, Population Grwoth, Military Burden, 
Non-Defense Spending, Primary School 
Enrolment, Secondary School Enrolment Positive
Birdi, Dunne & 
Saal (2000)
Modified Feder-
Ram Model South Africa 1973-1993 GDP Growth
Employment Growth, Capital Stock Growth, 
Government Spending Growth, Defense related 
Dummy
Government procurement had a 
significant postive eefect on 
industrial growth
Simultaneous Equation Approach (Demand & Supply)
Deger & Smith 
(1983)
Simultaneous 
Equations 50 LDCs 1965-1973
Growth, Savings, Military 
Burden
Savings, Foreign Capital Flows, Population 
Growth, Military Expenditure, per capita Income, 
Agricultural Growth Rate, Inflation Rate




Equations 50 LDCs 1965-1973
Growth, Savings, Trade 
Balance, Military Burden
Savings, Foreign Capital Flows, Population 
Growth, Military Expenditure, per capita Income, 
Agricultural Growth Rate, Inflation Rate
Positive on Growth, Nagative 







GDP Growth, Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, 
Military Burden
Military Burden, Net Domestic Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, Growth of Agricultural 









GDP Growth, Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, 
Military Burden
Military Burden, Net Domestic Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, Growth of Agricultural 
Product, Growth of Government Expenditures, 
Inflation Negative
Table A.1 List of Past Studies 
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Table A.1 Continued 
 





Equations South Africa 1961-1997
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& Interstate War, Domestic Capital Formation, 
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Political Rights, Not Significant 
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Bullock & 
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Faini, Annez & 
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Patterns of 
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Deger & Smith 
(1983)
Simultaneous 
Equations 50 LDCs 1965-1973
Growth, Savings, Military 
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Savings, Foreign Capital Flows, Population 
Growth, Military Expenditure, per capita Income, 
Agricultural Growth Rate, Inflation Rate
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Balance, Military Burden
Savings, Foreign Capital Flows, Population 
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Positive on Growth, Nagative 
on Savings & Trade Balance
Faini, Annez & 
Taylor (1984)
Patterns of 
Development 101 Countries 1950-1970
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Military Burden
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private consumption, inflation, 
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Policy Model Pakistan 1974-1991
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Export Share, Investment Share, Capacity 
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Government Spending
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Labor Growth, Domestic Savings, Military 
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Savings, Current Account Share, Labor Force 
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American 1948-1979 Education Spending Defense, per capita Income Change
Negative in Venezuela, No 
Significance in 7 Countries, 
Positive in 10 Countries (6 
Linear & 4 Quadratic)
Harris, Kelly & 
Pranowo (1988) Trade-Offs
50 Countries & 
12 Asian 1980
Education, Health, Housing 
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Asia 1974-1986 Education, Health
Military Expenditure, Government Expenditure, 
Education Expenditure, Health Expenditure Negative on Both
Babin (1990)
Two-Wave Panel 
Regression 69 LDCs 1965-1980
Commercial Energy 
Consumed Per Capita
Military Expenditure, Secondary School 
Enrolment, World System Position, Type of 
Regime, Type of Head of State
Both Military Expenditure and 
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Per Capita Energy 
Consumption, Per Capita 
GNP, PQLI
Military Expenditure, Military Burden, Per Capita 
Military Expenditure, Arms Import, Military 
Participation Rate, Input/Output Variables of 
Education and Health, Secondary Enrolment 
Ratio, Infant Mortality Rate, Calories 
Consumption Per Diem, Gross Domestic 
Investment, 5 of Labor Force in Industry, FDI, 
Total External Debts/GNP, Annual Growth Rates
Military Expenditure & 
Educations are Allies, Military 
Expenditures & Health are 
Adversaries, Military 
Expenditures & PQLI Negative, 
Military Expenditures are 




Single Equation Turkey 1925-1998 Education, Health Defense Burden, per capita Income Growth Negative on Both
Yildirim & Sezgin 
(2002)
Three Equation 
System Turkey 1924-1996 Education, Health
Growth Rate of Education, Housing, Defense, 
Taxes, Secondary School Enrolment, GDP
Negative on Health, Positive on 
Education
Agricultural & Industry Output
Faini, Annez & 
Taylor (1984)
Patterns of 
Development 101 Countries 1950-1970
Investments, Imports, 
Industrial Production, 
Agricultural Output, Tax 
Receipt
per capita GDP, Population, Capital Inflow, 
Military Burden
Negative on Investments & 
Agricultural Output, Positive 
on Tax Receipt
Employment
Dunne & Watson 
(2000)
Labor Demand 
Function South Africa 1961-1990 Employment Output, Real Wage, Military Burden Negative and Significant






Function Turkey 1950-1997 Employment Real Wage, Military Expenditure Negative in the Long Run
Azam, Khan, 






Lanka 1990-2013 Unemployment Rate
Military Expenditure, Energy Consumption, GDP 
Per Capita, FDI, Population Growth
Negative on Unemployment 
Rate, Positive on Employment
Export & Import
Faini, Annez & 
Taylor (1984)
Patterns of 
Development 101 Countries 1950-1970
Investments, Imports, 
Industrial Production, 
Agricultural Output, Tax 
Receipt
per capita GDP, Population, Capital Inflow, 
Military Burden
Negative on Investments & 




Equations 50 LDCs 1965-1973
Growth, Savings, Trade 
Balance, Military Burden
Savings, Foreign Capital Flows, Population 
Growth, Military Expenditure, per capita Income, 
Agricultural Growth Rate, Inflation Rate
Positive on Growth, Nagative 







GDP Growth, Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, 
Military Burden
Military Burden, Net Domestic Savings Rate, 
Current Account Balance, Growth of Agricultural 






Equations South Africa 1961-1997
Growth, Savings, Trade 
Balance, Military Burden
Labor Growth, Domestic Savings, Military 
Burden, per capita GDP, Trade Balance, 
Agricultural Growth, Non-Military Government 




Growth, Savings, Trade 
Balance, Military Burden
Savings, Military Burden, Growth, Inflation, 
Exchange Rate, Greek Military Spending, NATO 
Defense Share
Positive on Growth, Negative 




Regression 115 Countries 1978-1988 GDP per capita Growth
Investment, Population Growth, Size of Armed 
Forces, Military Imports, Size of Government 
Budget
Positive for Army Size, 








5 Soth Asian 
Countries 1980-1999 FDI
Military Expenditure, Globalization Index, 
Information and Communication Technology, 
Human Capital, Population Growth, Investment, 
Government Expenditure, GDP Growth, Inflation, 




Sectional 92 Countries 1990-2008 FDI
Military Expenditure, Corruption, Energy 
Consumption, Law & Order, Nato, WTO, 
Government Spending, Investment Treaties, 
Foregin Debt, Investor Risk Ratings, Budget 
Balance, Population, Arms Transfer
Negative in Low Corruption, 





Cross Sectional 101 Countries 1986-1994 PQLI, Economic Growth
Defense Burden, Urbanization Rate, Population 
Growth, Ethnic Diversity




Table A.1 Continued 
 
 
AUTHORS MODEL SAMPLE PERIOD DEPENDENT VARIABLES INDEPENDENT VARIABLES RESULTS
Income Distribution
Abell (1994) OLS US 1972-1991
Two Measurements of 
Income Distribution
Military Expenditure, Non-Military Expenditure, 
Taxes, Inflation, Interest Rate, Economic Growth
Positive Coefficient on Military 
Expenditure, meaning Military 
Expenditure associates with 
Increasing Income Inequality
Ali & Galbraith 
(2003) Panel Regression 160 Countries 1987-1997 Inequality
Military Expenditure, Size of Armed Forces, GDP 
Growth, per capita Income
Positive Effect on Income 
Inequality
PQLI
Rosh (1986) Cross Sectional 68 Countries
1970, 1975, 
1980 PQLI
Military Burden, per capita GNP, Commodity 
Concentration in Exports, Degree of Democracy, 
Arms Imports No Effect
Davis & Chan 
(1990)
Three Stage 
Least Square Taiwan 1961-1985
PQLI, GNP Per Capita, Social 
Spending, Savings Rate, 
Export Rate
Military Expenditure, Military Participation, 
Social Spending, GNPPer Capita, Savings Rate, 
Export Rate, Birth Rate
No Significant Influence on 
Social Welfare




Per Capita Energy 
Consumption, Per Capita 
GNP, PQLI
Military Expenditure, Military Burden, Per Capita 
Military Expenditure, Arms Import, Military 
Participation Rate, Input/Output Variables of 
Education and Health, Secondary Enrolment 
Ratio, Infant Mortality Rate, Calories 
Consumption Per Diem, Gross Domestic 
Investment, 5 of Labor Force in Industry, FDI, 
Total External Debts/GNP, Annual Growth Rates
Military Expenditure & 
Educations are Allies, Military 
Expenditures & Health are 
Adversaries, Military 
Expenditures & PQLI Negative, 
Military Expenditures are 




Cross Sectional 101 Countries 1986-1994 PQLI, Economic Growth
Defense Burden, Urbanization Rate, Population 
Growth, Ethnic Diversity
































Investment Fixed Effect t ‐1
.124                  
(2.878)*** .502 12766.633 13530.926 3511 119
t ‐5
.080                   
(1.742)* .468 11276.271 12024.766 3091 119
t ‐10
.012                   
(.267) .497 8946.772 9665.517 2549 118
Pooled t ‐1
.083                   
(2.267)** .158 14493.080 14530.062 3511 119
t ‐5
.050                   
(1.331) .117 12727.127 12763.345 3091 119
t ‐10
‐.016                 
(‐.445) .117 10266.176 10301.237 2549 118
Savings Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.083                 
(‐1.622) .784 14033.781 14798.884 3534 119
t ‐5
‐.270                 
(‐4.404)*** .706 13175.212 13924.348 3107 119
t ‐10
‐.155                 
(‐2.744)*** .761 10099.351 10824.231 2555 119
Pooled t ‐1
.023                   
(.537) .649 15636.477 15673.498 3534 119
t ‐5
.001                   
(.015) .447 15021.996 15058.244 3107 119
t ‐10
.086                   
(1.502) .352 12532.052 12567.127 2555 119
Private 
Consumption Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.470                 
(‐8.937)*** .788 14176.901 14941.406 3517 119
t ‐5
‐.086                 
( ‐1.415) .735 13041.823 13790.439 3094 119
t ‐10
‐.015                 
(‐.278) .796 9855.798 10580.192 2545 119
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(‐14.813)*** .576 16496.653 16533.645 3517 119
t ‐5
‐.557                 
(‐9.906)*** .437 15260.913 15297.136 3094 119
t ‐10
‐.472                 
(‐8.157)*** .388 12539.918 12574.970 2545 119
Public 
Consumption Fixed Effect t ‐1
.559                   
(22.675)*** .705 8852.194 9616.805 3520 119
t ‐5
.359                   
(12.619)*** .656 8361.346 9110.042 3096 119
t ‐10
.174                   
(6.091)*** .671 6597.173 7321.664 2547 119
Pooled t ‐1
.698                   
(28.107)*** .290 11832.551 11869.549 3520 119
t ‐5
.557                   
(20.683)*** .231 10736.581 10772.808 3096 119
t ‐10
.387                   
(14.122)*** .196 8759.556 8794.612 2547 119
Education Fixed Effect t ‐1
.087                   
(4.344)*** .741 934.206 1534.178 1052 116
t ‐5
.096                   
(4.167)*** .707 918.275 1511.912 1040 119
t ‐10
.094                   
(4.605)*** .742 468.640 1037.144 914 113
Pooled t ‐1
.135                   
(5.307)*** .058 2184.585 2214.336 1052 116
t ‐5
.137                   
(5.180)*** .069 2012.979 2042.660 1040 119
t ‐10
.108                   
(4.492)*** .104 1504.347 1533.254 914 113
Health Fixed Effect t ‐1
.062                   
(3.528)*** .831 ‐1648.933 ‐980.321 1623 119
t ‐5
.003                   
(.144) .828 ‐1600.173 ‐934.343 1587 119
t ‐10
.050                   
(3.532)*** .831 ‐1585.923 ‐935.806 1459 118
Pooled t ‐1
.051                   
(3.457)*** .296 555.612 587.964 1623 119
t ‐5
.042                   
(2.817)*** .263 599.472 631.689 1587 119
t ‐10
.030                   
(2.284)** .244 488.102 519.815 1459 118
Agriculture 
Value Added Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.043                 
(‐1.095) .882 11188.168 11943.892 3443 118
t ‐5
‐.000                 
(‐.013) .900 9220.918 9961.006 3032 118
t ‐10
.061                   
(1.581) .904 7504.843 8221.053 2497 118
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(‐9.877)*** .565 15580.679 15617.544 3443 118
t ‐5
‐.442                 
(‐8.810)*** .568 13536.432 13572.534 3032 118
t ‐10
‐.342                 
(‐6.491)*** .550 11233.858 11268.795 2497 118
Industry Value 
Added Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.053                 
(‐1.238) .805 11755.718 12511.335 3440 118
t ‐5
‐.138                 
(‐3.135)*** .801 10236.858 10976.824 3029 118
t ‐10
‐.200                 
(‐4.560)*** .817 8114.453 8830.564 2495 118
Pooled t ‐1
.630                   
(12.188)*** .360 15740.566 15777.425 3440 118
t ‐5
.537                   
(9.973)*** .298 13946.716 13982.812 3029 118
t ‐10
.426                   
(7.628)*** .254 11506.306 11541.238 2495 118
Unemployment 
Rate Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.218                 
(‐4.280)*** .793 2883.586 3452.973 1308 105
t ‐5
‐.111                 
(‐3.458)*** .798 2692.336 3252.732 1263 104
t ‐10
‐.054                 
(‐1.939)* .775 2509.935 3056.836 1169 103
Pooled t ‐1
.091                   
(1.403) .094 4718.012 4749.070 1308 105
t ‐5
‐.002                 
(‐.037) .088 4499.558 4530.405 1263 104
t ‐10
.025                   
(.656) .064 4082.375 4112.758 1169 103
Exports Fixed Effect t ‐1
.119                   
(1.990)* .892 15225.371 15991.139 3553 119
t ‐5
.116                   
(1.821)* .892 13462.276 14211.929 3120 119
t ‐10
.022                   
(.337) .903 10930.084 11655.690 2570 119
Pooled t ‐1
‐.071                 
(‐.750) .363 21409.910 21446.963 3553 119
t ‐5
‐.083                 
(‐.833) .350 18942.753 18979.027 3120 119
t ‐10
‐.229                 
(‐2.190)** .349 15714.516 15749.626 2570 119
Imports Fixed Effect t ‐1
.301                   
(4.623)*** .873 15871.444 16637.281 3555 119
t ‐5
.479                   
(6.393)*** .851 14503.723 15253.534 3124 119
t ‐10
.197                   
(2.690)*** .872 11508.034 12233.736 2572 119
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(‐.146) .344 21592.747 21629.804 3555 119
t ‐5
‐.012                 
(‐.113) .284 19291.075 19327.356 3124 119
t ‐10
‐.323                 
(‐3.047)*** .289 15799.818 15834.932 2572 119
Foreign Direct 
Investment Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.047                 
(‐1.699)* .331 9592.116 10356.126 3503 119
t ‐5
‐.058                 
(‐1.900)* .329 8922.434 9672.166 3122 119
t ‐10
‐.094                 
(‐2.502)** .216 8177.599 8904.167 2590 119
Pooled t ‐1
‐.075                 
(‐3.712)*** .142 10347.046 10384.014 3503 119
t ‐5
‐.083                 
(‐3.651)*** .087 9770.071 9806.348 3122 119
t ‐10
‐.095                 
(‐3.800)*** .089 8452.139 8487.295 2590 119
Urbanization 
Rate Fixed Effect t ‐1
.172                   
(5.455)*** .963 10743.833 11510.262 3572 119
t ‐5
.198                   
(6.742)*** .970 8800.696 9552.320 3170 119
t ‐10
.163                   
(6.157)*** .979 6419.942 7147.796 2617 119
Pooled t ‐1
.761                   
(11.365)*** .600 19113.732 19150.817 3572 119
t ‐5
.756                   
(11.085)*** .604 16917.462 16953.831 3170 119
t ‐10
.624                   
(8.998)*** .615 13876.632 13911.851 2617 119
Gini Coefficient Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.085                 
(‐.503) .886 1771.431 2286.614 678 109
t ‐5
.097                   
(.641) .892 1662.261 2151.419 657 104
t ‐10
‐.135                 
(‐1.070) .879 1573.895 2039.969 600 101
Pooled t ‐1
‐1.282               
(‐5.416)*** .065 3102.460 3129.575 678 109
t ‐5
‐1.247               
(‐6.212)*** .093 2965.394 2992.320 657 104
t ‐10
‐.872                 
(‐4.774)*** .083 2699.902 2726.284 600 101
Life Expectancy Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.051                 
(‐2.297)** .910 8278.108 9044.085 3559 119
t ‐5
‐.028                 
(‐1.259) .920 6955.759 7707.070 3162 119
t ‐10
‐.049                 
(‐2.357)** .938 5164.693 5892.356 2613 119
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(3.005)*** .554 13850.387 13887.450 3559 119
t ‐5
.107                   
(3.149)*** .529 12446.096 12482.450 3162 119
t ‐10
.094                   
(2.557)** .496 10523.137 10558.346 2613 119
Literacy Rate Fixed Effect t ‐1
‐.203                 
(‐1.542) .933 1313.754 1754.757 342 110
t ‐5
‐.172                 
(‐.862) .927 1325.888 1757.222 336 108
t ‐10
‐.237                 
(‐1.546) .944 1111.351 1536.212 307 109
Pooled t ‐1
‐.139                 
(‐.537) .410 1972.850 1995.859 342 110
t ‐5
‐.332                 
(‐1.029) .391 1956.354 1979.256 336 108
t ‐10
‐.240                 
(‐.823) .366 1774.863 1797.224 307 109
Mortality Rate Fixed Effect t ‐1
.574                   
(6.433)*** .907 18085.736 18851.538 3554 119
t ‐5
.474                   
(5.606)*** .917 15492.172 16243.679 3167 119
t ‐10
.454                   
(5.949)*** .936 11956.208 12684.061 2617 119
Pooled t ‐1
.105                   
(.866) .592 23209.188 23246.243 3554 119
t ‐5
.016                   
(.135) .576 20544.758 20581.121 3167 119
t ‐10
‐.016                 
(‐.130) .549 16957.424 16992.643 2617 119
Note: The t-values are shown in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at 99%, ** at 95%, and * at 90%.
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